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In distributed systems users often need to share sensitive data with other users
based on the latter’s ability to satisfy various policies. In many cases the data owner
may not even know the identities of the data recipients, but deems it crucial that they
are legitimate; i.e., satisfy the policy. Enabling such data sharing over the Internet
faces the challenge of (1) securely associating access policies with data and enforcing
them, and (2) protecting data as it traverses untrusted proxies and intermediate
repositories. Furthermore, it is desirable to achieve properties such as: (1) flexibility
of access policies; (2) privacy of sensitive access policies; (3) minimal reliance on
trusted third parties; and (4) efficiency of access policy enforcement. Often schemes
enabling controlled data sharing need to trade one property for another. In this
dissertation, we propose two complimentary policy-based data sharing schemes that
achieve different subsets of the above desired properties.
In the first part of this dissertation, we focus on CiphertextPolicy Attribute-
Based Encryption (CP-ABE) schemes that specify and enforce access policies cryp-
tographically and eliminate trusted mediators. We motivate the need for flexi-
ble attribute organization within user keys for efficient support of many practical
applications. We then propose Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Set Based Encryption
(CP-ASBE) which is the first CP-ABE scheme to (1) efficiently support naturally
occurring compound attributes, (2) support multiple numerical assignments for a
given attribute in a single key and (3) provide efficient key management. While the
CP-ASBE scheme minimizes reliance on trusted mediators, it can support neither
context-based policies nor policy privacy. In the second part of this dissertation,
we propose Policy Based Encryption System (PBES), which employs mediated de-
cryption and supports both context-based policies and policy privacy. Finally, we
integrate the proposed schemes into practical applications (i.e., CP-ASBE scheme
with Attribute-Based Messaging (ABM) and PBES scheme with a conditional data
sharing application in the Power Grid) and demonstrate their usefulness in practice.




Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment




Professor Virgil D. Gligor, Chair/Advisor
Professor William A. Arbaugh
Dr. Himanshu Khurana
Professor Gang Qu





To my parents, Hima Bindu and Narasimha Rao, and my wife Lakshmi.
ii
Acknowledgments
I owe my gratitude to several people who have made this dissertation possible.
First and foremost I would like to thank my advisor, Professor Virgil D. Gligor, for
his guidance, support and encouragement over the years and for letting me work on
this dissertation remotely. I owe my deepest gratitude to Dr. Himanshu Khurana
who has been a mentor and guide since the early days of my graduate studies. This
dissertation would not have been possible with out his encouragement and guidance.
I would like to thank my committee members Professor Charles B. Silio, Professor
Gang Qu and Professor William A. Arbaugh for their valuable time and feedback.
I would like to thank Professor Carl A. Gunter and Professor Manoj M.
Prabhakaran for their collaboration, support and advice. I would like to thank
my co-authors Fariba Khan, Omid Fatemieh, Musab Alturki, Farhana Ashraf and
Arindam Khan for their enthusiastic collaboration. I would like to thank house
mates Karthikeyan Chandrasekhar, Manikandan Ramasamy, Akshay Naik, Kalyani
Tikekar, Ragunath Sankaranarayanan and Jitamitra Karcherla, and fellow students
Radostina Koleva, Laurent Eschenauer and Gelareh Taban for their friendship, help
and support. Thanks are also due to fellow student Soo Bum Lee who helped me
comply with many university regulations while I was away form the school.
I would also like to thank Dr. Tracy Chung, Maria Hoo and Melanie Prange
at the ECE Graduate Studies Office who helped me navigate the many rules and
regulations of the department and graduate school.
I am grateful to my parents Hima Bindu and Narasimha Rao, and my wife
iii
Lakshmi for their patience, understanding and support throughout this long en-
deavor.
Finally I would like to acknowledge the financial support provided by the
National Science Foundation under grant numbers CNS 05-24695 and CNS 07-




List of Tables vii
List of Figures viii
List of Abbreviations ix
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Policy-Based Data Sharing Without a Mediating Server . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Data Sharing Based on Private, Context-Sensitive Policies . . . . . . 5
1.3 Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3.1 Attribute-Based Messaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3.2 Conditional Sharing of Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) Data
in the Power Grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.5 Dissertation Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2 Related Work 10
2.1 Policy-Based Data Sharing Without a Mediating Server . . . . . . . . 10
2.1.1 Secure Two-Party Data Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1.2 Secure Multi-Party Data Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Data Sharing Based on Private, Context-Sensitive Policies . . . . . . 14
3 Policy Based Data Sharing Without a Mediating Server 16
3.1 Need for Organizing Attributes in CP-ABE User Keys . . . . . . . . 20
3.1.1 Supporting Compound Attributes Efficiently . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.1.2 Supporting Multiple Value Assignments . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.3 Our CP-ASBE Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.4 Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.5 Efficiency Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.6 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4 Data Sharing Based on Private, Context Sensitive Policies 50
4.1 Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.1.1 Related Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.1.2 Our Approach - PBES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.2 Notation and Security Notions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.3 Building Blocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.3.1 Key Encapsulation Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.3.2 Data Encapsulation Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.3.3 Policy and Key Encapsulation Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.4 Policy Based Encryption System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.5 Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.6 Application Design Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
v
5 Application Integration and Evaluation 93
5.1 Attribute-Based Messaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.1.1 CP-ASBE for ABM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.1.2 ABM Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.1.3 Experimental Evaluation of CP-ASBE in ABM . . . . . . . . 104
5.2 Context-Sensitive Data Sharing in the Power Grid . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.2.1 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.2.2 PBES for Context-Sensitive Data Sharing in the Power Grid . 114





3.1 Possible adversary query terms in G1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
5.1 Grammar for ABM Addresses and Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.2 Example of Policy Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.3 PBES Entities vs. Power Grid Entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
vii
List of Figures
4.1 Policy-based Message Encryption and Decryption . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.2 Encryption in PKEM-DEM scheme instantiated using RSA-KEM
and DEM1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.1 ABM Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.2 Policy Specialization Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.3 Messaging and Address Resolution Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.4 Attribute Keying Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.5 Encryption and Decryption Times . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107








BAA Balancing Authority Area
CA Certificate Authority
CCA2 Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack
CP-ABE Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
CP-ASBE Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Set-Based Encryption
DEM Data Encapsulation Mechanism
FERC Federal Energy Regulation Commission
ISO Independent System Operator
KDC Key Distribution Center
KEM Key Encapsulation Mechanism
KP-ABE Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
MS Messaging
MTA Mail Transport Agent
NASPI North American SynchroPhasor Initiative
NERC North American Electric Reliability Council
OTCCA One-Time Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attacks
PBES Policy Based Encryption System
PDC Phasor Data Concentrator
PDP Policy Decision Point
PKEM Policy and Key Encapsulation Mechanism
PMU Phasor Measurement Unit
PS Policy Specialization
PSS Policy Specialization Server
RC Reliability Coordinators




In distributed systems users often need to share sensitive data with other users
based on the latter’s ability to satisfy various policies. In many cases the data owner
may not even know the identities of the data recipients, but deems it crucial that
they are legitimate; i.e., satisfy the policy. For example, consider a health care set-
ting where an employee of a drug company is trying to target a message regarding
the predicted side effects of a new drug to all patients at participating hospitals,
who have a certain medical condition and have indicated a willingness to partici-
pate in clinical trials at their discretion. The drug company considers the potential
side effects of the new drug private data and thus would like to keep the message
confidential from anyone who does not satisfy the conditions above. However the
drug company and thus the employee are not allowed to know the identity of pa-
tients until they actually sign up for the trial. This example also illustrates the
expressiveness and flexibility that needs to be provided for such policies.
Enabling such data sharing over the Internet faces the challenge of (1) securely
associating access policies with data and enforcing them, and (2) protecting data
as it traverses untrusted proxies and intermediate repositories. Furthermore, it is
desirable to achieve properties such as: (1) flexibility of access policies; (2) privacy
of sensitive access policies; (3) minimal reliance on trusted third parties; and (4)
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efficiency of access policy enforcement. Often schemes enabling controlled data
sharing need to trade one property for another. In this dissertation, we (1) propose
two complimentary policy-based data sharing schemes that achieve different subsets
of the above desired properties, (2) formally analyze their security, and (3) and
study their application to real systems. The first scheme addresses the problem of
policy-based data sharing when there are no trusted mediating servers to enforce
policies. In this case, while we minimize reliance on trusted third parties, we do
not address policy privacy and limit ourselves to policies that do not use contextual
information. The second scheme addresses the problem of policy-based data sharing
when context-based policies, that is, policies that use context information, need to
be supported and when privacy of policies needs to be protected. However, in this
case we leverage a trusted server to enforce policies and incur some trust liability.
We integrate the proposed schemes into two practical applications, the first scheme
with Attribute-Based Messaging (ABM) and the second scheme with a conditional
data sharing application in the Power Grid, and demonstrate their usefulness in
practice.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.1 we present the
problem of enabling policy based data sharing without a mediating server to enforce
policies. In Section 4.4 we present the problem of enabling policy based data sharing
that supports context-based policies and provides policy privacy. In Section 1.3 we
present the applications with which we integrate the schemes proposed in this work.
In Section 1.4 we present our contributions and in Section 1.5 we give an outline for
the remaining part of this dissertation.
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1.1 Policy-Based Data Sharing Without a Mediating Server
In some applications, a data owner may want to share data with other users
based on the latter’s ability to satisfy various policies but my not have access to or
may not be wiling to trust a server to enforce the access policies associated with his
data. For example, consider users of social networking sites such as Facebook, who
do not have access to trusted mechanisms that protect their private data at sufficient
level of granularity. Another example is of a data owner who outsources data storage
to a third party such as a cloud provider but is not willing to trust the provider with
the content or to enforce his policies. In such situations, a typical solution is for the
data owner to place encrypted data at a publicly accessible place, for example, the
social networking site, and distribute the decryption keys to legitimate users. This
requires that the data owner establish a secure channel with every user he wishes
to share a given data item with. However, this is not always possible, as the data
owner may not even know the identity of users that satisfy the policies associated
with his data as illustrated by the health care example discussed above.
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) [63, 37, 10, 23, 56, 24, 55, 36, 43, 49] is
a new public-key encryption paradigm that provides an appealing alternative in
the above scenarios. ABE enables policy-based data sharing by associating and en-
forcing access policies cryptographically, eliminating the need for trusted mediating
servers to enforce the policies. Existing ABE schemes come in two complimentary
forms, namely, Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE) or Predicate encryption schemes [63, 37,
23, 56, 43] and Ciphertext-Policy ABE (CP-ABE) schemes [10, 24, 55, 36, 49]. In
3
KP-ABE or Predicate encryption schemes, as the name indicates, attribute policies
(predicates) are associated with keys and data is annotated with attributes. Users
are able to decrypt a ciphertext only if the attributes associated with it satisfy the
predicate associated with their key. In CP-ABE schemes on the other hand, at-
tribute policies are associated with data and attributes are associated with keys.
Users are able to decrypt a ciphertext only if the attributes associated with their
keys satisfy the policy associated with the ciphertext. In ABE schemes a trusted
entity distributes attribute or predicate keys to users. Data owners encrypt their
data using the public parameters provided by the trusted entity and attributes or
an attribute policy and can make the encrypted data public. ABE schemes thus
provide encrypt-and-publish semantics and minimize reliance on trusted third par-
ties. CP-ABE is more intuitive as it is similar to traditional access control model
where data is protected with access policies and users with credentials satisfying
the policy are allowed access to the data. While a lot of the research effort in
designing CP-ABE schemes has been devoted to: (1) improving expressiveness of
policies supported and (2) providing privacy of policies, little attention has been
paid to the organization of attributes within user keys. In this work, we motivate
the need for flexible attribute organization within user keys of CP-ABE schemes
for efficient support of many practical applications and propose Ciphertext-Policy
Attribute Set Based Encryption (CP-ASBE) scheme, the first CP-ABE scheme to
organizes attributes within user keys.
4
1.2 Data Sharing Based on Private, Context-Sensitive Policies
In some applications, data sharing is based on policies that include contextual
information. For an example, consider the Electric Power Grid where power system
operators need to cooperate with each other to operate the grid safely and reliably
but they also compete with each other as business entities. A utility company, say
A, might be willing to share sensitive sensor data from its electrical network with
neighboring utility companies only when there is a frequency or voltage disturbance
in the regional grid that adversely affects them but not under normal circumstances.
While CP-ABE is a very useful encryption paradigm, existing CP-ABE schemes,
including the one proposed in the first part of this dissertation, and ABE schemes
in general, cannot efficiently support policies with contextual information, especially,
when the context could be ephemeral as in the above example. This is because, for
CP-ABE schemes to take contextual information into account, it should be made
available in the user keys. But given that (1) contextual information is usually
short lived, (2) key generation is very expensive in existing CP-ABE schemes, and
(3) existing CP-ABE schemes lack revocation mechanisms, supporting context-based
policies in CP-ABE schemes is currently infeasible. In this work, we propose Policy
Based Encryption System (PBES), an encryption scheme and system that supports
context-sensitive policies and policy privacy by employing mediated decryption while




Attribute Based Messaging (ABM) enables messages to be addressed using at-
tributes of recipients rather than an explicit list of recipients. Such messaging offers
benefits of efficiency, exclusiveness, and intensionality, but faces challenges in access
control and confidentiality. In [12] we employed Attribute-Based Access Control
(ABAC) to provide a manageable access control mechanism and presented an ABM
architecture leveraging existing messaging systems. However providing end-to-end
confidentiality remained a challenge given that a message sender may not know who
the legitimate recipients of his messages are. In this work we demonstrate use of
Ciphertex-Policy Attribute Based Encryption to provide end-to-end confidential-
ity. We integrate our CP-ASBE scheme with ABM architecture and show that our
scheme incurs very little overhead over an existing efficient CP-ABE scheme while
providing much more flexibility.
1.3.2 Conditional Sharing of Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) Data
in the Power Grid
Increasing power consumption and major recent events such as the August
2003 blackout [73] means the power system operators are compelled to improve
the reliability of the grid through wide area situational awareness, monitoring and
control. Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs), envisioned to be deployed across the
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grid, have the potential to provide wide area situational awareness when their data is
shared among operators. In deregulated grids worldwide and in the North American
grid in particular, utilities share sensitive data with their local Reliability Coordi-
nators (RCs) as required by regulatory laws. However as shown by the example
in Section 4.4 above, they might not be comfortable disclosing sensitive PMU data
with other entities except under certain conditions including transient conditions in
the grid at the time of access. In this work, through a prototype implementation
and integration, we show that PBES scheme can meet the requirements of most
applications that depend on shared PMU data.
1.4 Contributions
In this dissertation we make the following contributions:
1. We motivate the need for flexible organization of attributes within user keys of
CP-ABE schemes for efficient support of many practical applications. We pro-
pose Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Set Based Encryption (CP-ASBE), a novel
CP-ABE scheme that organizes attributes within user keys. We show that,
by organizing attributes in user keys into recursive sets and allowing policies
to impose dynamic constraints on how the attributes within a key may be
combined to satisfy a policy, we can (1) efficiently support naturally occur-
ring compound attributes, (2) support multiple numerical assignments for a
given attribute in a single key, and (3) provide efficient key management. We
formally prove that the CP-ASBE scheme is secure against chosen plaintext
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attacks (CPA) in the generic group model. We provide a library implementa-
tion of the scheme that is easy to integrate with applications.
2. We study the application of CP-ASBE, and CP-ABE in general, to a novel
messaging paradigm the we proposed [12], namely, Attribute-Based Messaging
(ABM). By integrating CP-ASBE with ABM architecture and evaluating it
we show that CP-ASBE incurs very little overhead over an existing efficient
CP-ABE scheme while providing much more flexibility.
3. We develop Policy and Key Encapsulation Mechanism Data Encapsulation
Mechanism (PKEM-DEM) encryption scheme, which is a generic construc-
tion to securely associate and encapsulate policies and data. We present Pol-
icy Based Encryption System (PBES) that uses the PKEM-DEM scheme and
leverages a trusted server for mediated decryption. We show that PBES,
(1) supports flexible and expressive policies, including context-based policies,
(2) provides policy privacy, and (3) provides encrypt-and-publish semantics.
In addition to the security notions of message indistinguishability and policy
indistinguishability, we define a new security notion of pair-wise indisting-
uishability for PBES where adversaries need to distinguish between pairs of
messages and policies. We show that PBES satisfies the above security notions
in the chosen ciphertext attack model.
4. We study the application of PBES to a real world problem, namely, condi-
tional Phasor Measurement Unit data sharing in the Power Grid that calls for
increased data sharing when the grid is unstable. Through prototype imple-
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mentation and evaluation we show that PBES is efficient enough to support
most power applications that depend on shared sensor data.
1.5 Dissertation Organization
The remaining part of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter
2 we review the related work and provide a context for the contributions of this
dissertation. In Chapter 3 we discuss the problem of enabling policy based data
sharing without relying on a mediating server to enforce policies. In Chapter 4 we
discuss the problem of enabling data sharing based on context sensitive policies while
preserving the privacy of those policies. In Chapter 5 we study the application of the
schemes proposed in Chapters 3 and 4 by integrating them with real systems and





In this chapter we review the related work in the areas of policy-based data
sharing without mediating servers to enforce the policy and data sharing based on
private, context-sensitive policies and present our contributions in the context of the
related work.
2.1 Policy-Based Data Sharing Without a Mediating Server
Many cryptography mediated data sharing schemes fall into this area and can
be grouped into two classes, namely, data sharing between two parties and data
sharing between multiple parties. Here we review relevant works in each class and
contrast them with our work.
2.1.1 Secure Two-Party Data Sharing
Traditional hybrid public-key encryption standardized for e-mail in PEM [51],
PGP [76], and S/MIME [59], and traditional identity-based encryption [15] enable
two-party data sharing. However, they require the sender to know who the recipient
is at the time of sending and thus can be considered as supporting data sharing
based on a singleton policy which is the identity of the recipient. Policy-based
cryptographic schemes proposed in [2, 8], and several works in the area of “hidden
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policies and credentials” [18, 33, 48] enable data sharing based on a policy but focus
on two-party interactions. In contrast we focus on multi-recipient data sharing based
on flexible policies.
2.1.2 Secure Multi-Party Data Sharing
Secure multi-party data sharing is considered in many contexts. Here we focus
on those contexts that do not rely on mediating servers to enforce policy including
secure group communication, secure mailing lists and policy-based cryptography and
attribute-based encryption. In secure group communication, a group of users share
a secret-key that is updated whenever the group membership changes. Any member
of the group could send a secure message to the group. However, in secure group
communication members need to establish a shared secret key before communicat-
ing. Key distribution and key agreement schemes for secure group communication
include [20, 58, 71, 74, 62, 44, 65, 40, 47, 13]. Furthermore, secure group communi-
cation is efficient for long standing data sharing associations and can be considered
as supporting data sharing based on group membership attribute, i.e., a singleton
attribute policy.
Secure mailing lists [46, 45] provide confidentiality for messages sent on mail-
ing lists using a partially trusted list server, i.e., the messages contents are not
revealed to the list server. Similar to secure group communication schemes secure
mailing lists are efficient for long standing data sharing associations and can be
considered as supporting data sharing based on mailing list membership attribute,
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i.e., a singleton attribute policy. In contrast in our work we focus on enabling data
sharing based on flexible and expressive policies.
Attribute-Based Encryption is the most closely related work to ours. While
the concepts and ideas related to Attribute-Based Encryption have been alluded to
in literature as far back as [15, 25] Sahai and Waters [63] proposed what is considered
the first ABE scheme. Their scheme supported policies with a single threshold gate.
Furthermore, the threshold value k, and size of the gate n used in a policy, are fixed
during setup in their Large Universe construction. Pirretti et al., [57] showed how
to overcome this limitation of fixed k and n and demonstrated the use of threshold
access policies for two applications. Traynor et al., [72] further demonstrated its
scalability by applying it to massive conditional access systems. Goyal et al., [37]
first defined the two complimentary forms of ABE, namely, KP-ABE and CP-ABE,
and provided a construction for a KP-ABE1 scheme. The proposed KP-ABE scheme
supported all monotonic boolean encryption policies and was later extended by
Ostrovsky et al., [56] to support non-monotonic boolean formulas.
Bethencourt et al., [10] gave the first construction for a CP-ABE scheme. Their
construction supported all monotonic boolean encryption policies and the security
of their scheme was argued in the generic group model. Cheung and Newport [24]
gave the first standard model construction of CP-ABE scheme. While their scheme
supported both positive and negative attributes it was limited to policies with single
AND gates. Nishide et al., [55] extended the scheme in [24] to support policy secrecy.
Goyal et al. gave the first standard model construction of CP-ABE scheme that
1The scheme proposed in [63] can in retrospect be viewed as a KP-ABE scheme.
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could support flexible policies [36]. Their scheme can realize all non-monotonic
boolean formulas. However, since it is constructed using a KP-ABE scheme of [37],
it is inefficient and has bounded ciphertext, i.e., the size of supported policies is fixed
at setup. Katz et al. proposed a KP-ABE scheme in [43] that can support flexible
policies and achieve policy secrecy. This scheme can be used to realize CP-ABE
schemes but such schemes have a bounded ciphertext. Most of the past work on CP-
ABE schemes and ABE schemes in general, which enable policy-based data sharing
without a trusted mediator, is focused on improving the expressibility of encryption
policies and providing policy privacy. In contrast ours is the first work to consider
the organization of attributes within user keys which we demonstrate is necessary in
practical applications. Our CP-ASBE scheme is the first to organize user attributes
in keys and allow users to impose dynamic constraints on how attributes can be
combined to satisfy policies, allowing our scheme more flexibility and efficiency in
practice.
Support for numerical attributes in CP-ABE schemes was first discussed in [10].
While the technique may be applicable to other schemes none of the existing CP-
ABE schemes can support multiple value assignments for a given numerical attribute
within a single key. Our CP-ASBE scheme is the first scheme to do so allowing it
to support applications where such attribute assignments are needed without sacri-
ficing flexibility of range queries (i.e., numerical comparisons) in policies for those
attributes.
Policy-based cryptography scheme proposed in [7] enables data sharing based
on flexible policies but is vulnerable to collusion attacks. That is, users who do not
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individually satisfy the policy associated with a given cipher-text may still be able
to decrypt it when they collude.
2.2 Data Sharing Based on Private, Context-Sensitive Policies
Our work in this area touches upon topics in areas of policy/attribute based
encryption, hidden credentials and policies, cryptographic file systems and efficient
and effective key management. Here we review relevant works in each of these areas
and contrast them with our work. Some of these works are reviewed in Section 2.1
above but are repeated here for completeness.
Identity Based Encryption (IBE) [16, 25] schemes and messaging systems em-
ploying it [52] allow the association of a flexible policy with objects and support
exchange in open distributed systems but do not keep the policy secret and are
designed for two-party communication where the sender identifies the recipient in
the encryption. Similarly, Policy-based cryptographic schemes proposed in [2, 8]
allow the association of a flexible policy with objects and support exchange in open
distributed systems but do not keep the policy secret and are designed for two-party
communication where the sender identifies the recipient in the encryption. Several
works in the area of “hidden policies and credentials” [19, 33, 48] provide message
and policy secrecy but focus on two-party interactions.
Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) systems such as Ciphertext-Policy ABE
(CP-ABE) [10, 24, 36, 49] including our CP-ASBE scheme and cryptographic file sys-
tem FSGuard [69] allow the association of flexible policies with objects for multiple
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recipients defined by those policies and support exchange in open distributed sys-
tems but do not provide policy secrecy and cannot support context-based policies.
Recent work by [55] extends CP-ABE to support policy secrecy but significantly
limits it’s policy flexibility and does not support context-based policies. Predicate
Encryption scheme proposed in [43] also allows the association of flexible policies
with objects for multiple recipients defined by those policies, supports exchange in
open distributed systems and provides policy secrecy but does not support context-
based policies. PEAPOD [42] focuses on one-to-many messaging with both message
and policy secrecy but does not provide efficient key management and is also vul-
nerable to collusion attacks.
Kapadia et al., [42], leverage the proxy re-encryption solution of [46] and
propose an attribute-based publishing scheme that allows users to publish data
encrypted under an attribute policy so that only users who satisfy the policy can
decrypt it with the additional property that the policy associated with the cipher-
text remains private. However, this scheme suffers form the drawback that it is
susceptible to collusion.
The work that probably comes closest to ours is the enterprise object encryp-
tion architecture proposed by [32] back in 1994. In their architecture a Key Release
Agent releases decryption keys to users after authentication in a manner similar to
that done by KDC in PBES. However, they do not develop a secure policy based
encryption scheme for their architecture.
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Chapter 3
Policy Based Data Sharing Without a Mediating Server
In distributed systems users need to share sensitive objects with others users
based on the latter’s ability to satisfy a policy. I some cases this data sharing
needs to be accomplished without relying on trusted mediated servers. For exam-
ple, users of many social networking sites such as Facebook, do not have access to
trusted mechanisms that protect their private data at sufficient level of granularity.
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) ushers in a new paradigm where such policies
are specified and cryptographically enforced in the encryption algorithm itself. Ex-
isting ABE schemes come in two complimentary forms, namely, Key-Policy ABE
(KP-ABE) schemes and Ciphertext-Policy ABE (CP-ABE) schemes. In KP-ABE
schemes [37, 43, 56, 63], as the name indicates, attribute policies are associated
with keys and data is annotated with attributes. Only those keys associated with
a policy that is satisfied by the attributes annotating the data are able to decrypt
the data. In CP-ABE schemes [10, 24, 36, 55], on the other hand, attribute policies
are associated with data and attributes are associated with keys. Only those keys
whose associated attributes satisfy the policy associated with the data are able to
decrypt it.
CP-ABE is more intuitive as it is similar to traditional access control model
where data is protected with access policies and users with credentials satisfying
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the policy are allowed access to it. Among the various CP-ABE schemes proposed
the one proposed by Bethencourt et al. [10], which we will hereafter refer to as
BSW, is the most practical to date. It supports arbitrary strings as attributes,
numerical attributes in keys and integer comparisons in policies and provides a
means for periodic key refreshment. Furthermore, the authors have developed a
software prototype with a friendly interface for integration in systems. However,
BSW and other CP-ABE schemes are still far from being able to support the needs
of practical applications, which require considerable flexibility in specifying policies
and managing user attributes as well as increased efficiency. This is in part due to
the fact that keys in current CP-ABE schemes can only support user attributes that
are organized logically as a single set; i.e., users can use all possible combinations
of attributes issued in their keys to satisfy policies. This, we observe, imposes some
undesirable restrictions which are outlined below.
First, this makes it both cumbersome and tedious to capture naturally occur-
ring “compound attributes”, i.e., attributes build intuitively from other (singleton)
attributes, and specifying policies using those attributes. For example, attributes
that combine a traditional organizational role with short-term responsibilities result
in useful compound attributes; e.g., ‘Faculty’ in ‘College of Engineering’ serving as
‘Committee Chair’ of a ‘University Tenure Committee’ in ‘Spring2009’ are all valid
attributes in their own right and are likely to be used to describe users. The only way
to prevent users from combining such attributes in undesirable ways when using cur-
rent CP-ABE schemes is by appending the (singleton) attributes as strings; i.e., fac-
ulty collegeOfEngineering committeeChair univTenureCommittee Spring2009. But
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this approach has an undesirable consequence in that it makes it challenging to sup-
port policies that involve other combinations of singleton attributes used to build the
compound attribute; e.g., policies targeting “all committee chairs in Spring2009” or
“faculty serving on tenure committees”. This is because the underlying crypto in
CP-ABE schemes can only check for equality of strings and thus cannot extract the
“faculty” or “committeeChair” attributes from a compound attribute such as the
one described above.
Second, CP-ABE schemes that support numerical attributes (i.e., allow nu-
merical comparisons in policies) are limited to assigning only one value to any given
numerical attribute within a key. But there are many real world systems where
multiple numerical value assignments for a given attribute are common; e.g., stu-
dents enrolled in multiple courses identified by numeric course numbers in a given
semester, users with multiple accounts at a particular bank, disease codes for in-
dividual diseases and disease classes used widely in health care. Furthermore, the
ability to compare across such multiple value assignments adds flexibility to policy
specification. For example, consider a college student enrolled in two junior level
courses, 357 and 373, and two senior level courses, 411 and 418 respectively. With-
out support for multiple numerical value assignments for a given attribute specifying
policies to target students enrolled in senior level courses, such as “course number
greater than or equal to 400 and less than 500” is tedious and cumbersome.
In this chapter, we propose Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Set Based Encryption
(CP-ASBE), a form of CP-ABE, that addresses the above limitations of CP-ABE
by introducing a recursive set based structure on attributes associated with user
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keys. Specifically CP-ASBE allows, 1) user attributes to be organized into a recur-
sive family of sets and 2) policies that can selectively restrict decrypting users to
use attributes from within a single set or allow them to combine attributes from
multiple sets. Thus, by grouping user attributes into sets such that those belong-
ing to a single set have no restrictions on how they can be combined, CP-ASBE
can support compound attributes without sacrificing the flexibility to easily specify
policies involving the underlying singleton attributes. Similarly, multiple numerical
assignments for a given attribute can be supported by placing each assignment in a
separate set.
While restricting users to use attributes from a single set during decryption
can be thought of as a regular CP-ABE scheme, the challenge in constructing a CP-
ASBE scheme is in selectively allowing users to combine attributes from multiple
sets within a given key while still preventing collusion, i.e., preventing users from
combining attributes from multiple keys. We provide a construction for a CP-
ASBE scheme that builds on BSW and evaluate its performance through a prototype
implementation. We show that our construction is secure against chosen-plaintext
attacks in the generic group model. However, our construction can be efficiently
extended to be secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks using a transformation like
Fujisaki-Okamoto [34, 75] or the techniques of Canetti, Halevi and Katz [22] just
like the BSW scheme [10].
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.1 we further
demonstrate the limitations of existing CP-ABE schemes and motivate the need for
CP-ASBE. In Section 3.2 we give some preliminaries. In Section 3.3 we present
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our construction of CP-ASBE. In Section 3.4 we formally prove its security. In
Section 3.5 we discuss optimizations and discuss the efficiency of the scheme.
3.1 Need for Organizing Attributes in CP-ABE User Keys
The ability to group attributes into sets and to frame policies that can selec-
tively restrict the decrypting key to use attributes belonging to the same set is a
powerful feature more than one might realize initially. In this section we illustrate
its versatility by solving various problems in different contexts which did not have
any reasonably efficient solutions prior to this.
3.1.1 Supporting Compound Attributes Efficiently
While existing CP-ABE schemes offer unprecedented expressive power for ad-
dressing users, for several natural scenarios they are inadequate. We illustrate this
with the following natural example and show how CP-ASBE provides a simple so-
lution.
Consider attributes for students derived from courses they have taken. Each
student has a set of attributes (Course, Year, Grade) for each course she has taken.
In the following, consider a simple policy “Students who took a 300 ≤ Course
< 400 in Year ≥ 2007 and got Grade > 2.” Using a CP-ABE scheme for this is
challenging because, for instance, a student can take multiple courses and obtain
different grades in them. The policy circuit will have to ensure that she cannot
mix together attributes from different sets to circumvent the policy. We point out
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a few possible options of using CP-ABE, but all unrealistic or unsatisfactory. The
efficiency parameters considered are the number of designed attributes given to each
student, and the size of the designed policy (a circuit, with designed attributes as
inputs, for enforcing the policy).
• For each course that the student has taken, let there be a single designed
(boolean) attribute that she gets (e.g. cyg:373 2008 4). But the designed pol-
icy will have to (unrealistically) anticipate all such attributes that will satisfy
the policy (e.g., cyg:300 2007 3 or cyg:301 2007 3 or . . . or cyg:399 2010 4).
• Anticipate (again, unrealistically) all possible policies that may occur which
the student’s attributes will satisfy, and give her compound boolean attributes
corresponding to each of these policies (e.g., cyg:373 2008 4, cyg:373 2008,
cyg:(≥300) 2008, cyg:(≥400) 2007-or-cyg:(≥300) 2008 (≥3), . . .). In this case
our designed policy is minimal, with just an input gate (labeled by the at-
tribute cyg:(≥ 300,< 400) (≥ 2007) (> 2)) and an output gate.
• Fix an upper bound on the number of courses a student could ever take, say
50, and give all attributes indexed by a counter (e.g. Course#1, Year#1,
Grade#1 etc.); then the policy will have to incorporate several cases (e.g.,
(400 < Course#1 ≥ 300 and Year#1 ≥ 2007 and Grade#1 > 2) or . . . or
(400 < Course#50 ≥ 300 and Year#50 ≥ 2007 and Grade#50 > 2)). This
increases the policy size by a factor of 50.
If a policy can refer to more than one course, all these approaches will lead to even
more inefficiency or restrictions. In particular, in the third (and the most efficient)
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approach, if a policy refers to just two courses, the blow up will be by a factor of
2500 instead of 50.
We stress that these are not the only possibilities when using CP-ABE. In
general, by giving more attribute keys, the circuit complexity of the policies can be
reduced (the first two options above being close to the two extremes). One could
achieve slightly smaller policies by adding judiciously chosen auxiliary attributes
and adding some structure to values taken by these attributes (for instance, in the
third option above, one can let the counter monotonically increase with the course
number). However, the resulting schemes are still unrealistically inefficient in terms
of policy size and/or number of keys, and further makes attribute revocation even
less efficient.
A CP-ASBE scheme can be used to overcome these issues by assigning multiple
values to the group of attributes but in different sets. In our example, for each course
that a student has taken, she gets a separate set of values for the attributes (Course,
Grade, Year). Thus the number of designed attributes she receives is comparable to
the number of natural attributes she has; further, the designed policy is comparable
in size to that of a policy that did not enforce the requirement that attributes
from different courses should not be mixed together. In short, using CP-ASBE, we
can obtain efficient ciphertext policy encryption schemes for several scenarios where
existing CP-ABE scheme are insufficient.
Expressiveness in terms of Attribute-Databases Supported. Some of the
flexibility illustrated above can be understood by viewing the association of at-
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tributes to a user as an entry in a database table. In such a table — which we will
call the attribute table — each row stands for a user and each column (other than
user identity) for an attribute.1 The policy associated with a cipher-text could be
considered a query into this table, to identify all users whose attributes satisfy a
certain predicate.
The expressive power of a CP-ABE scheme is given by the class of queries into
this table that the scheme can support. For instance, BSW CP-ABE [10] supports
a large class of such queries. One challenge to increase the expressive power would
be to broaden this class. However, there is another important dimension in which
the expressive power of CP-ABE scheme can be improved, by supporting a more
general class of attribute tables. The above description of CP-ABE required that
each user ID appears in only one row in the table. (In other words, the user ID must
be a “superkey” in the attribute table.) Of course, a table can be forced to have this
property, but leading to large blow ups in the number of designed attributes that
a user receives or the size of the designed policy. On the other hand, a CP-ASBE
scheme can directly support a table with multiple rows per user: attributes in each
row is given as a separate set.
1In the case of a “large universe” of attributes, the number of columns could be very large
— say all strings of 256 bits – and the resulting sparse table will never be stored directly as a
table. Our examples shall mostly use the small universe scenarios, though they extend to the large
universe setting as well.
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3.1.2 Supporting Multiple Value Assignments
A major motivation for CP-ASBE is to support multiple value assignments
for a given attribute in a single key.2 To illustrate this, suppose score is a 6-bit
integer representing the score a user receives in a game. (The user may possess
several other attributes in the system.) The user can play the game several times
and receive several values for score. This numerical attribute will be represented
by 12 boolean attributes: score bit0 0, score bit0 1, . . ., score bit6 0 and score bit6 1,
corresponding to the values 0 and 1 for the six bits in the binary representation of
the value. Now consider a user who has two values of score, 33 (binary 100001) and
30 (binary 011110). By obtaining attributes for the bit values of these two numbers,
the user gets all 12 boolean attributes, effectively allowing him to pretend to have
any score he wants.
CP-ASBE solves this problem elegantly: each value assignment of the numer-
ical attribute is represented in a separate set with six boolean attributes each (one
for each bit position). Note that attributes other than score need not be repeated.
Application: Efficient revocation. ABE schemes suffer from lack of an effective
revocation mechanism for keys that have been issued (just like IBE). To address
this in CP-ABE in a limited manner, Bethencourt et al. [10] propose adding an
expiration time attribute to a user’s key indicating the time (i.e., a numerical value)
until which the key is considered to be valid. Then a policy can include a check
2Note that multiple values for an attribute is relevant only when the attribute in question is
not a boolean attribute (in a monotonic policy).
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on the expiration time attribute as a numerical comparison. However, in practice
the validity period of sensitive attributes has to kept small to reduce the window
of vulnerability when a key is compromised, e.g. a day, a week or a month. At
the end of this period the entire key will have to be re-generated and re-distributed
with an updated expiration time imposing a heavy burden on the key server and
key distribution process.
CP-ASBE solves this problem more efficiently. First, we observe that while
key validity is limited because of the window of vulnerability, the actual attribute
assignments change far less frequently. Second, we observe that it is possible to
add attributes retroactively to a user key, both in BSW CP-ABE and CP-ASBE, if
key server is able to maintain some state information about the user key. Then, by
allowing multiple value assignments to the expiration time attribute we can simply
add a new expiration value to the existing key. Thus, while we require the key server
to maintain some state we avoid the need to generate and distribute new keys on a
frequent basis. This reduces the burden on the key server by a factor proportional
to the average number of attributes in user keys.
3.2 Preliminaries
Bilinear Maps. Let G1,G2,GT be cyclic (multiplicative) groups of order p, where
p is a prime. Let g1 be a generator of G1, and g2 be a generator of G2. Then
e : G1 ×G2 → GT is a bilinear map if it has the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: for all u ∈ G1, v ∈ G2 and a, b ∈ Zp, we have e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab.
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2. Non-degeneracy: e(g, h) 6= 1.
Usually, G1 = G2 = G. G is called a bilinear group if the group operation and
the bilinear map e are both efficiently computable.
Key Structure. In CP-ABE schemes, an encryptor specifies an access structure
for a ciphertext which is referred to as the ciphertext policy. Only users with se-
cret keys whose associated attributes satisfy the access structure can decrypt the
ciphertext. In CP-ABE schemes so far, a user’s key can logically be thought of as
a set of elements each of which corresponds to an associated attribute, such that
only elements within a single set may be used to satisfy any given ciphertext policy
(i.e. collusion resistance). In our scheme however, we use a recursive set based key
structure where each element of the set is either a set itself (i.e. a key structure)
or an element corresponding to an attribute. We define a notion of depth for this
key structure, which is similar to the notion of depth for a tree, that limits this
recursion. That is, for a key structure with depth 2, members of the set at depth 1
can either be attribute elements or sets but members of a set at depth 2 may only
be attribute elements. The following is an example of a key structure of depth 2:
{
CS-Department, Grad-Student, {Course101, TA}, {Course525, Grad-Student}
}
The depth of key structures that can be supported by our scheme is a system
parameter that should be decided at the time of setup. That is, if the system is
setup with a depth parameter of 5, keys of depth 5 or less can be supported. For
ease of exposition, we will describe our scheme for key structures of depth 2. But
our construction is easily generalized to support keys of any depth d where d is fixed
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at setup.
The key structure defines unique labels for sets in the key structure. For key
structures of depth 2, just an index (arbitrarily assigned) of the set among sets at
depth 2 is sufficient to uniquely identify the sets. Thus if there are m sets at depth
2 then an unique index i where 1 ≤ i ≤ m is (arbitrarily) assigned to each set. The
set at depth 1 is referred to as set 0 or simply the outer set. If ψ represents a key
structure then let ψi represent the ith set in ψ. Individual attributes inherit the
label of the set they are contained in and are uniquely defined by the combination of
their name and their inherited label. That is, while a given attribute might appear
in multiple sets it can appear only once in any set. In the above example, the
outer set and {Course525, Grad-Student} are assigned labels 0 and 2 respectively,
and the two instances of the attribute Grad-Student are distinguished by the unique
combination of their inherited set label and attribute name, (0, Grad-Student) and
(2, Grad-Student), respectively. By default, a user may only use attribute elements
within a set to satisfy a given ciphertext policy. That is, a user with the key structure
from the above example may combine individual attributes either from the outer set
(i.e., {CS-Department, Grad-Student}) or from the set {Course101, TA} or from
the set {Course525, Grad-Student} to satisfy the policy associated with a given
ciphertext but may not combine attributes across the sets. However, an encryptor
may choose to allow combining attributes from multiple sets to satisfy the access
structure by designating translating nodes in the access structure as explained below.
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Access Structure. We build on the access structure used in [10] which is a tree
whose non-leaf nodes are threshold gates. Each non-leaf node of the tree is defined
by its children and a threshold value. Let ncx denote the number of children and kx
the threshold value of node x, then 0 < kx ≤ ncx. When kx = 1, the threshold gate
is an OR gate and when kx = ncx it is an AND gate. The access tree also defines an
ordering on the children of a node, i.e., they are numbered from 1 to ncx. For node
x such a number is denoted by index(x). Each leaf node y of the tree is associated
with an attribute which is denoted by att(y). Furthermore, the encrypting user
may designate some nodes in an access tree as translating nodes. Their function will
become clear as we discuss below the conditions under which a key structure is said
to satisfy an access tree.
Let T be an access tree whose root node is r. Let Tx denote a subtree of T
rooted at node x. Thus Tr is the same as T . Now we will define the conditions
under which a key structure ψ is said to satisfy a given access tree T assuming there
are no designated translating nodes in the access tree. We will then extend the
definition to consider the presence of translating nodes. A key structure ψ is said
to satisfy the access tree T if and only if T (ψ) returns a non-empty set S of labels.
We evaluate Tx(ψ) recursively as follows. If x is a non-leaf node we evaluate Tx′(ψ)
for all children x′ of x. Tx(ψ) returns a set Sx containing unique labels such that
for every label lbl ∈ Sx there exists at least one set of k ≥ kx children such that for
each child x′ of these k children Sx′ contains the label lbl. If x is a leaf node then
the set Sx returned by Tx(ψ) contains a label lbl if and only if att(x) ∈ ψlbl. Thus a
key structure is is said to satisfy an access tree if it contains at least one set that has
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all the attributes needed to satisfy the access tree. Note that attributes belonging
to multiple sets in the key structure cannot be combined to satisfy the access tree.
However, if there are designated translating nodes in the access tree, the al-
gorithm T (ψ) is modified as follows. The algorithm Tx(ψ) is the same as above
when x is a leaf node. When x is a non-leaf node we evaluate Tx′(ψ) for all children
x′ of x. Tx(ψ) returns a set Sx containing unique labels such that for every label
lbl ∈ Sx there exists at least one set of k ≥ kx children such that for each child x′
of these k children Sx′ either contains the label lbl or x
′ is a translation node and
Sx′ 6= ∅. Thus, if node x is a designated translating node then, even if the attribute
elements used to satisfy the predicate represented by the subtree rooted at x belong
to a different set in the key structure than those used to satisfy the predicates rep-
resented by the siblings of x the decrypting user is able to combine them to satisfy
the predicate represented by the parent node of x.
Syntax of CP-ASBE Scheme. A CP-ASBE scheme consists of four algorithms,
Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt and Decrypt. The algorithm Setup produces a master
key and a public key for the scheme. KeyGen takes as input the master-key, a user’s
identity and an attribute set; it produces a secret key for the user. Encrypt takes
as input the public key of the scheme, a message and an access tree, and outputs
a ciphertext. Finally, Decrypt takes a ciphertext and a secret-key (produced by
KeyGen), and if the access-tree used to construct the ciphertext is satisfied by the
attribute set for which the secret-key was generated, then it recovers the message
from the ciphertext.
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Security of CP-ASBE Scheme. Our notion of message indistinguishability for
CP-ASBE scheme against chosen-plaintext attacks is similar to that for CP-ABE
schemes [10].
Setup. The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives public parameters, PK,
to the adversary.
Phase 1. The adversary makes repeated queries for private keys corresponding to
attribute sets A1, . . . ,Aq1 .
Challenge. The adversary submits two equal length messages M0 and M1, and a
challenge access structure T ∗ such that none of the private keys obtained in
Phase 1 corresponding to attribute sets A1, . . . ,Aq1 satisfy the access structure.
The challenger flips a random coin b, and encrypts Mb under T ∗. The resulting
ciphertext CT is given to the adversary.
Phase 2. Phase 1 is repeated with the restriction that none of the attribute sets
Aq1+1, . . . ,Aq satisfy the access structure corresponding to the challenge.
Guess. The adversary outputs a guess b′ of b.
The advantage of an adversary A in this game is defined as Pr[b′ = b] − 1
2
.
This game could easily be extended to include chosen-ciphertext attacks by allowing
for decryption queries in Phase 1 and Phase 2.
Definition 3.1. A CP-ASBE scheme is secure against chosen-plaintext attacks if
all probabilistic polynomial time adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in
the game above.
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3.3 Our CP-ASBE Construction
A key challenge in designing CP-ABE schemes is preventing users from pooling
together their attributes. BSW CP-ABE achieves this by binding together all the
attribute key components for each user with a random number unique to the user.
Since in a CP-ASBE scheme one must prevent arbitrary combination of attributes
belonging to different sets (even if they belong to the same user), a natural idea
would be to similarly use a unique random number for binding together attribute
key components for each set, in addition to using a random number for each user.
However, a CP-ASBE scheme must also support specific combinations of attributes
from different sets, as specified in an access-tree. The key idea in our construction
is to include judiciously chosen additional values in the ciphertext (and in the key)
that will allow a user to combine attributes from multiple sets all belonging to the
same user. As it turns out, such a modification could introduce new subtle ways for
multiple users to combine their attributes. Our construction shows how to thwart
such attacks, using appropriate levels of randomization among different users’ keys.
Let G0 be a bilinear group of prime order p and let g be a generator of G0.
Let e : G0 × G0 → G1 denote a bilinear map. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → G0 be a hash
function that maps any arbitrary string to a random group element. We will use
this function to map attributes described as arbitrary strings to group elements.
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Setup(d = 2). The setup algorithm chooses random exponents α, βi ∈ Zp∀i ∈
{1, 2}. The algorithm sets the public key and master key as:
PK =(G, g, h1 = gβ1 , f1 = g
1
β1 , h2 = g
β2 , f2 = g
1
β2 , e(g, g)α)
MK =(β1, β2, g
α)
Note that to support key structures of depth d, i will range from 1 to d.
KeyGen(MK, A, u). Here u is the identity of a user and A = {A0, A1, . . . , Am} is a
key structure. A0 is the set of individual attributes in the outer set (i.e. set 0) and A1
to Am are sets of attributes at depth 2 that the user has. Let Ai = {ai,1, . . . , ai,ni}.
That is, ai,j denotes the j-th attribute appearing in set Ai, and ni denotes the
number of attributes in the set Ai. (Note that for different values of (i, j), ai,j can
be the same attribute.) The key generation algorithm chooses a unique random
number, r{u} ∈ Zp, for user u. It then chooses a set of m unique random numbers,
r
{u}
i ∈ Zp, one for each set Ai ∈ A, 1 ≤ i ≤ m. For set A0, r
{u}
0 is set to be the same
as r{u}. It also chooses a set of unique random numbers, r
{u}
i,j ∈ Zp, one for each
(i, j), 0 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni. The issued key is:
SKu =
(








i,j , D′i,j = g
r
{u}





β2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ m
)
Note that the operations on the exponents in the above equations are modulo the
order of the group, which is prime. Hence division in the exponent is well-defined.
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We omit the mod for convenience. Elements Ei enable translation from r
{u}
i (i.e., set
Ai at depth 2) to r
{u} (i.e., the outer or parent set A0 at depth 1) at the translating
nodes. Elements Ei and Ei′ can be combined as Ei/Ei′ to enable translation from
r
{u}
i′ (i.e., set Ai′) to r
{u}
i (i.e., the set Ai) at the translating nodes. Similarly, for a
key structure of depth d, there will elements that enable translation from a set at
depth d to its parent set at depth d− 1 and they will use βd and random numbers
corresponding to the appropriate sets.
Encrypt(PK, M, T ). M is the message, T is an access tree. The algorithm
associates a polynomial qτ with each node τ (including the leaves) in the tree T .
These polynomials are chosen in the following way in a top-down manner, starting
from the root node R. For each internal node τ in the tree, the degree dτ of the
polynomial qτ is set to be one less than the threshold value kτ of that node, that
is, dτ = kτ − 1. For leaf nodes the the degree is set to be 0. For the root node R
the algorithm picks a random s ∈ Zp and sets qR(0) = s. Then, it chooses dR other
points randomly to define the polynomial qR completely. For any other node τ , it
sets qτ (0) = qparent(τ)(index(τ)) and chooses dτ other points randomly to completely
define qτ . Here parent(τ) denotes the parent node of τ . Let Y denote the set of
leaf nodes in T . Let X denote the set of translating nodes in the access tree T . Then
the ciphertext CT returned is as follows:
CT =
(
T , C̃ = M · e(g, g)α·s, C = hs1, C̄ = hs2, ∀y ∈ Y : Cy = gqy(0),
C ′y = H(att(y))
qy(0), ∀x ∈ X : Ĉx = hqx(0)2
)
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Translating values Ĉ ′xs together with Ei
′s in user keys allow translation between
sets at a translating node x as will be described in the Decrypt function. Note that
the element C̄ is the same as Ĉr where r denotes the root node. A variant of the
scheme would be where C̄ is not included in the ciphertext but is only released at
the discretion of the encrypting user as Ĉr. This would restrict decrypting users to
only use individual attributes in the outer set except when explicitly allowed by the
encrypting user by designating translating nodes.
Decrypt(CT, SKu). Here we describe the most straightforward decryption al-
gorithm without regard to efficiency. The decryption algorithm is a recursive al-
gorithm similar to the tree satisfaction algorithm described in Section 3.2. The
decryption algorithm first runs the tree satisfaction algorithm on the access tree
with the key structure i.e., T (A), and stores the results of each of the recursive
calls in the access tree T . That is, each node t in the tree is associated with
a set St of labels that was returned by Tt(A). If A does not satisfy the tree T
then the decryption algorithm returns ⊥. Otherwise the decryption algorithm picks
one of the labels, i, from the set returned by T (A) and calls a recursive function
DecryptNode(CT, SKu, t, i) on the root node of the tree. Here CT is the cipher-
text CT = (T , C̃, C,∀y ∈ Y : Cy, C ′y,∀x ∈ X : Ĉx), SKu is a private key, which is
associated with a key structure denoted by A, t is a node from T , and i is a label
denoting a set of A. Note that the ciphertext CT now contains tree information that
is augmented by the results from T (A). DecryptNode(CT, SKu, t, i) is defined
as follows.
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If t ∈ Y, i.e., node t is a leaf node, then DecryptNode(CT, SKu, t, i) is
defined as follows. If att(t) /∈ Ai where Ai ∈ A thenDecryptNode(CT, SKu, t, i) =⊥.
If att(t) = ai,j ∈ Ai where Ai ∈ A then:

















Note that set from which the satisfying attribute ai,j was picked is implicit in the
result e(g, g)r
{u}
i ·qt(0) (i.e., indicated by r
{u}
i ). When t /∈ Y, i.e., node t is a non-leaf
node, then DecryptNode(CT, SKu, t, i) proceeds as follows:
1. Compute Bt which is an arbitrary kt sized set of child nodes z such that z ∈ Bt
only if either (1) label i ∈ Sz or (2) label i′ ∈ Sz for some i′ 6= i and z is a
translating node. If no such set exists then return ⊥.
2. For each node z ∈ Bt such that label i ∈ Sz call DecryptNode(CT, SKu, t, i)
and store output in Fz.
3. For each node z ∈ Bt such that i′ ∈ Sz and i′ 6= i callDecryptNode(CT, SKu, t, i′)
store output in F ′z. If i 6= 0 then translate F ′z to Fz as follows:







β2 ) · e(g, g)r{u}i′ ·qz(0) = e(g, g)r{u}i ·qz(0)






















z , where k = index(z), B
′
z = {index(z) : z ∈ Bt}









i ·qt(0) when i 6= 0
e(g, g)r
{u}·qt(0) when i = 0
The output ofDecryptNode(CT, SKu, r, i) function on the root node r is stored
in Fr. If i = 0 we have Fr = e(g, g)
r{u}·qr(0) = e(g, g)r
{u}·s otherwise we have
Fr = e(g, g)
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{u}
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Note how two elements Ei and Ei′ together with a translating value Ĉt at a
node t were used to translate between sets i and i′ at node t in step 3. Similarly,
note how a single element Ei together with a translating value was used to translate
between set i and the outer set. We note that if β1 = β2 then the scheme would
become insecure as colluding users could transitively translate from inner set i to
outer set and then from one key to the other by using the D elements from their
keys. Thus we need a unique β for every level that we need to support. When using
key structures of depth d, translating values, Ĉs, that help translate between sets
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at depth d or between a set at depth d and its parent at depth d − 1 will use βd.
And to allow translations across multiple levels at a given node, multiple translating
values using different βs will need to be released at that node.
Usage Example. We now demonstrate the usage of CP-ASBE with the example
policy from Section 3.1.1. When using two level key structures, the policy can be
written as follows using threshold gates:
4 OF 4
(
(Course > 300), (Course < 400), (Grade > 2), (Y ear > 2007)
)
Here, predicates such as Course > 300 will further be expanded and written using
their constituent boolean attributes. Recall that numerical attributes in CP-ASBE
are represented using a bag of bits representation, with a boolean attribute used to
represent each bit of the numerical value, as described in Section 3.1.2. Users can
be given keys with two levels. For example, for a user who has taken two courses
the structure of the issued key is as follows:
{
{Course = 304, Grade = 2, Year = 2007},{Course = 425, Grade = 3, Year = 2008}
}
While the user’s key will contain translation elements Ei’s, as long as there is no
designated translation node in the policy (i.e., ciphertext) the user will not be able
to combine his Grade and Year attributes for Course 425 with that of Course 304
to satisfy the above policy.
3.4 Security
The security proof for our scheme closely follows that of BSW CP-ABE [10]
and uses generic group [17, 66] and random oracle models [9]. Such a proof implies
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that the advantage of any adversary in the CP-ASBE security game is negligible, as
long as it uses the underlying groups and hash functions in a generic manner, and
makes only polynomially many accesses to them.
Generic Bilinear Group [17]. A generic group G0 with a bilinear map e :
G0 × G0 → G1 can be modeled by an oracle which uses random strings as handles
for the elements in the two groups G0 and G1.3 More precisely, we consider an oracle
O, which picks two random encodings of the additive group Fp into sufficiently long
strings, i.e., injective maps ψ0, ψ1 : Fp → {0, 1}m, where m > 3 log(p). We write
G0 = {ψ0(x)|x ∈ Fp} and G1 = {ψ1(x)|x ∈ Fp}. The oracle provides access to
the group operations (which we shall refer to as multiplication) in either group: for
example, queries of the form (multiply0, h, h
′) and (inverse0, h), will be answered
respectively by ψ0(ψ
−1
0 (h) + ψ
−1
0 (h
′)), ψ0(−ψ−10 (h)). If h or h′ is not in the range
of ψ0, then the oracle returns ⊥. The oracle also provides access to the identity
elements (ψ0(0), ψ1(0)), and canonical generators (ψ0(1), ψ1(1)) in the two groups,
as well as the ability to sample random elements in the groups. In addition, given
a query (pair, h, h′), where h = ψ0(α) and h
′ = ψ0(β), O returns h′′ = ψ1(αβ). To
relate to the notation of bilinear groups used in our construction, we will denote
ψ0(1) by g and ψ0(x) by g
x. Similarly we will let e(g, g)y denote ψ1(y). Then the
above pairing query to the oracle will be written as e(gα, gβ) and the response as
3We remark that it is not important to model the handles as random strings, but only as distinct
handles that can be named by the adversary. But we stick to the convention from [17], that was
used in [10], whose proof ours most closely resemble.
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e(g, g)αβ.
Finally, the oracle O also includes a random function H : {0, 1}∗ → G0. It
takes queries of the form (hash, a) for arbitrarily long strings a and returns H(a).
Theorem 3.1. Let O, G0, G1, and H be as defined above. For any adversary
A with access to O in the security game for the CP-ASBE scheme in Section 3.3
(using G0, G1, and H), suppose q is an upper-bound on the total number of group
elements it receives from queries to O and interaction with the CP-ASBE security
game. Then the advantage of A in the CP-ASBE security game is O(q2/p).
Proof Intuition. Let us say that s is the random secret split according to the
access structure T as described in the Encrypt function of Section 3.3. Let T ′ be
an access structure derived from T by removing the sub-trees under all translating
nodes, i.e., translating nodes become leaf nodes. For simplicity, let us assume for
now that all the leaves of T ′ are translating nodes in the original access structure
T . Let qt(0) represent the secret share associated with a translating node t. A user
has to obtain e(g, g)αs to recover the message encrypted using the access structure
T . He could pair C = gβ1s given in the ciphertext with D = g(α+r{u})/β1 in his key
to obtain e(g, g)αs+r
{u}s, i.e., e(g, g)αs blinded by e(g, g)r
{u}s. A user can cancel out
e(g, g)r
{u}s only if he satisfies the tree, i.e., by obtaining a set of e(g, g)r
{u}qt(0) that
can reconstruct e(g, g)r
{u}s. One can think of the key components given for each set
of attributes in the key structure as a unique key under the BSW scheme. That is,
if r{u} is the unique random number used in our CP-ASBE key then the set of key
components (including the translation element) corresponding to each set Ai can be
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thought of as a BSW key issued using a master secret key (β2, g
r{u}). Furthermore,
each of the sub-trees rooted at a translating node can be thought of an access
structure under the BSW scheme. Thus a given sub-tree can only be satisfied using
attributes from a single set, i.e. a single BSW key, as BSW is collusion resistant.
The proof below shows that the additional group elements that are available to an
adversary in our scheme do not adversely affect this collusion resistance. Thus a
user who has a key with a set that can satisfy the sub-tree under a translating
node t can obtain e(g, g)r
{u}qt(0). And since r{u} is unique to a CP-ASBE key, only
attributes from sets within a single CP-ASBE key can be used to satisfy T ′ and
thus the original access structure.
Proof. Recall that in the CP-ASBE security game the adversary has to distinguish
between challenge ciphertexts M0 ·e(g, g)α·s and M1 ·e(g, g)α·s. By a standard hybrid
argument one can consider a modified security game in which the adversary has to
distinguish between challenge ciphertexts e(g, g)α·s and e(g, g)θ, where θ is selected
uniformly at random form Fp. It is easy to show that any adversary that has
advantage ε in the original CP-ASBE game can be transformed into an adversary
that has an advantage of at least ε/2 in the modified game. We will now bound the
adversary’s advantage in the modified game to prove the theorem.
For this we describe a simulation of the modified game, such that the adver-
sary’s view in the simulation is distributed identical to that in the modified security
game with challenge ciphertext e(g, g)θ. Further, conditioned on an event of prob-
ability 1 − O(q2/p) in the simulation, we will show that this view is identical to
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what it would have been in the modified security game, with challenge ciphertext
e(g, g)α·s. Thus we will conclude that the advantage of the adversary is at most
O(q2/p).
At the setup time the simulation chooses α, β1, β2 at random from Fp. If β1 = 0
or β2 = 0 then setup is aborted just as it would be in the actual scheme. The public
parameters h1 = g
β1 , h2 = g
β2 , f1 = g
1
β1 , f2 = g
1
β2 , and e(g, g)α are sent to the
adversary.
When the adversary or the simulation call for evaluation of H on any new
attribute string a, a new random value ta is chosen from Fp, and the simulation
provides gta as the response to H(a) and stores it to respond to future queries on a.
When the adversary makes its k′th key generation query for attribute set Ak, the
simulation picks, (1) a new random value r{k} from Fp, (2) a new random value r{k}i
for every subset Aki ∈ Ak and (3) a new random value r
{k}
i,j for every ai,j ∈ Aki , for
every Aki ∈ Ak. It then computes, (1) D = g(α+r









i,j for each j ∈ Aki and each Aki ∈ Ak and (3) Ei = g(r
{k}+r
{k}
i,j )/β2 for each
Aki ∈ Ak. These values are passed on to the adversary.
In the challenge phase the adversary outputs a challenge access structure T ∗
along with two equal length messages MO,M1 ∈ G0. Let X∗ denote the set of
converging nodes in T ∗. Let Y∗ denote the set of leaf nodes in the access tree
T ∗. The simulator chooses a random s ∈ Fp and uses the linear secret sharing
scheme associated with T ∗ as described in Encrypt function of Section 3.3 to
construct shares qy(0)ofofs∀y ∈ Y∗. Let δx represent qx(0) for all x ∈ X∗, where qx is
polynomial associated with node x as described in Encrypt function of Section 3.3.
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Note that every leaf node is a descendent of a unique converging node. Let
λx,j represent qy(0) where y ∈ Y∗ is a descendent of x ∈ X∗ and represents attribute
j4. Furthermore, note that the choice of δx can be perfectly simulated by choosing
v random values µ1, . . . , µv uniformly and independently from Fp, for some value of
v, and then letting δx be fixed public linear combination of µv
′s and s. Similarly,
we can think of λx,j
′s as a fixed linear combination of some constants µ′1, . . . , µ
′
u and
δx. We will think of the δx
′s and λx,j
′s as such linear combinations later.
Finally the simulation chooses a random θ ∈ Fp, and constructs the encryption
as follows: C̃ = e(g, g)θ, C = hs1, ∀y ∈ Y∗, Cy = gλx,j and C ′y = gtj ·λx,j , and
∀x ∈ X∗Ĉx = hδx2 . These values are sent to the adversary.
When the adversary makes a query to the group oracles, if the adversary
provides as input a handle h that it did not receive from the oracle, then with
probability 1 − O(1/p2) such a handle is not in the range of ψ0 or ψ1. So, by
conditioning on an event of probability 1 − O(q/p2) (q being an upperbound on
the number of oracle queries made during the entire simulation), we can assume
that the oracle provides answers to only queries which use handles already given
out by the oracle. As such we may keep track of the algebraic expressions being
called for from the oracles as long as no “accidental collisions” occur. Specifically,
we think of an oracle query being a rational function ν = η/ξ in the variables
4Note we are assuming here that a given attribute is not represented by multiple leaf nodes
descending from the same converging node. We can accommodate such policies by adding one
more variable subscript to λ that identifies its position among descendents of a given converging
node. We omit it here for clarity.
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s, s, and µv
′s. An accidental collision is said to occur if
two distinct formal queries η/ξ 6= η′/ξ′ have the same value due to random choices of
the variables. We now condition that no such “accidental collisions” in either group
G0 or G1. For any pair of distinct formal queries η/ξ and η′/ξ′ within a group,
an accidental collision occurs only if the non-zero polynomial ηξ′ − ξη′ evaluates to
zero. The total degree of ηξ′−ξη′ in our case is a constant (at most 5). Then by the
Schwartz-Zippel lemma [64, 77] the probability of an accidental collision between
any pair of formal queries is O(1/p). By a union bound, the probability that any
such collision happens in our simulation is at most O(q2/p). Thus we can condition
on no “accidental collisions” occurring while retaining 1−O(q2/p) of the probability
mass.
Now we show that, subject to the condition that no “accidental collisions”
occur, the view of the adversary is identically distributed when we set θ = α · s in
the simulation. Since we are in the generic group model where each group element
is uniformly and independently chosen the only way that the adversary’s view can
differ in the case θ = α ·s is if there are two queries ν and ν ′ into G1 such that ν 6= ν ′
but ν |θ=α·s= ν ′ |θ=α·s. Since θ only occurs as e(g, g)θ in G1, the only dependence ν
or ν ′ can have on θ is by having some additive terms of the form γ · θ where γ is a
constant. Therefore we must have that ν − ν ′ = γ · α · s − γ · θ for some constant
γ 6= 0 for the adversary’s view to be different in the two simulations. We can then
artificially add the query ν − ν ′ + γ · θ = γ · α · s to the adversary’s queries. We
will now do a case analysis based on the information given to the adversary by the
simulation to show that an adversary can never construct a query for e(g, g)γ·α·s
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which will establish the theorem.
Table 3.1 enumerates all the possible queries into G1 by means of the bilinear
map and group elements given to the adversary by the simulation except for those
that involve β1 or β2 in every monomial as they will not be relevant for constructing
a query involving α · s. Here the variables j and j′ are possible attribute strings,
variables k and k′ are indices of secret key queries made by the adversary, and
variables i and i′ are indices of attribute subsets in a given secret key. The queries
are given in terms of λx,j
′s and δx
′s and not in terms of µv
′s and µ′u
′s. The adversary
has access to 1 and α in group G1 in addition to the queries shown in Table 3.1.
The adversary can query for an arbitrary linear combination of these and we will
show that no such linear combination can produce a polynomial of the form γ ·α · s
for some constant γ 6= 0.
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From Table 3.1 we see that the only way for an adversary to create a term
containing αs is by pairing sβ1 with (α + r
{k})/β1 to get αs + r
ks. The adversary
could create a query polynomial of the form γαs +
∑
k∈T γkr
ks, for some set T
and constants γ, γk 6= 0. In order for the adversary to get a query polynomial of
the form γαs the adversary must add other terms in order to cancel the terms of∑
k∈T γkr
ks. Observe that the only terms of the form rks that the adversary has
access to are obtained by pairing β2δx terms with (r
k+r
{k}
i )/β2 terms, since δx
′s are
linear combinations of µv
′s and s. The adversary could create a query polynomial















By design there exists at least one non empty set of δx
′s that can reconstruct s.
Without loss of generality we will assume that ∀k ∈ T the adversary picks a set T ′k
such that the set {δx|(i, x) ∈ T ′k} can reconstruct s. (For otherwise the adversary’s
polynomial cannot be of the form γαs thus proving the theorem.) The adversary still





i δx,∀k ∈ T
in order to obtain a query polynomial of the form γαs. Note that the only other
terms of the form r
{k}





i,j with some λx,j′ as λx,j′ is a linear combinations of µu
′s and δx. Thus
































The following case analysis concludes the proof:
Case 1: There exists some k ∈ T : ∃(i, x) ∈ T ′k such that the set of shares
Lk,i,x = {λx,j′ : ∃j : (j, j′) ∈ T ′′k,i,x} do not allow for the reconstruction of δx.
In this case, the term r
{k}
i δx will not be canceled and the adversary’s query
polynomial cannot be of the form γαs.
Case 2: For all k ∈ T and ∀(i, x) ∈ T ′k the set of shares Lk,i,x = {λx,j′ : ∃j :
(j, j′) ∈ T ′′k,i,x} allow for the reconstruction of δx. Then the only terms left in
the adversary’s query polynomial other than γαs are of the form tjr
{k}
i,j λx,j′
and the adversary needs to add other terms to cancel them from the query.
As seen in Table 3.1, the only term the adversary has access to that he can
use to cancel terms of the form tjr
{k}
i,j λx,j′ is the term r
{k}
i,j tj′λx,j′ but only when
j = j′. We will now show that there is at least one term of the form tjr
{k}
i,j λx,j′
in the adversary’s query polynomial such that j 6= j′ to complete the proof.
Fix any k ∈ T . Consider Ak the set of attributes corresponding to k′th ad-
versary key. By the assumption that no key should pass the challenge access
structure, and the properties of the secret sharing scheme we know that there
exists a δx : ∃i : (i, x) ∈ T ′k such that the set of shares L′k,i,x = {λx,j : j ∈ Aki :
Aki ∈ Ak} cannot reconstruct δx for any i : Aki ∈ Ak. Thus there must exist
at least one λx,j′ ∈ Lk,i,x that is linearly independent of L′k,i,x when written in
terms of δx and µv
′s. Thus for at least for one λx,j′ ∈ Lk,i,x there will be a
term of the form tjr
{k}
i,j λx,j′ : j 6= j′ left behind in the query for the adversary
does not have access to a term that can cancel it as evident from Table 3.1.
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Therefore no adversary query polynomial can be of the form γαs.
3.5 Efficiency Analysis
In this section we discuss the efficiency of CP-ASBE scheme instantiated with
two-levels. It is straightforward to estimate the efficiency of our key generation
and encryption algorithms. In terms of computation, our key generation algorithm
requires two exponentiations for every attribute in the key issued to the user and
two exponentiations for every set (including recursive sets for a scheme with levels
> 2) in the key. In terms of key size, the private key contains two group elements
per attribute and one group element per attribute set. Compared to BSW the
additional key generation cost is two exponentiations for every attribute set in terms
of computation and one group element per attribute set in terms of size. Encryption
involves two exponentiations per leaf node in the tree and one exponentiation per
translating node in the tree. The ciphertext contains two group elements per leaf
node and one group element per translating node. Compared to BSW the additional
cost is one exponentiation per translating node in terms of computation and one
group element per translating node in terms of size. The cost of decrypting a given
ciphertext however varies depending on the key used for decryption. Even for a
given key there might be multiple ways to satisfy the associated access tree. The
decrypt algorithm needs, 1) two pairings for every leaf node used to satisfy the tree,
2) one pairing for every translating node on the path from the leaf node used to the
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root and 3) one exponentiation for every node on the path from the leaf node to the
root. However, by employing the optimization technique of flattening the recursive
calls to DecryptNode, as described in BSW [10] albeit modified to accommodate
translating nodes, we can reduce the cost to 1) two pairings and one exponentiation
per leaf node used and 2) one pairing and one exponentiation per translating node
on the path from a used leaf node to the root. Compared to BSW the additional
cost is one pairing and one exponentiation per translating node on the path from a
used leaf node to the root. In a multi-level (level > 2) instantiation the overhead
will be per translation rather than per translating node as multiple translations may
be needed at a given translating node for such instantiations.
3.6 Implementation
We have implemented a two-level CP-ASBE scheme with an optimized decryp-
tion function. Our implementation leverages the cpabe toolkit (http://acsc.csl.
sri.com/cpabe/) developed for BSW which uses the Pairing-Based Cryptography
library (http://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/). The interface for the cpasbe toolkit
is similar to that of cpabe toolkit and is as follows:
cpasbe-setup Generates a public key and a master key.
cpasbe-keygen Given a master key, generates a private key for a given set of
attributes; compiles numerical attributes into ’bag of bits’ representation and
treats the resulting attributes as a ’set’.
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cpasbe-enc Given a public key, encrypts a file under a given access policy; numer-
ical comparisons in the policy are represented by access sub-trees comprising
’bag of bits’ representation of the numerical attribute with the root node of
the sub-tree treated as a translating node.
cpasbe-dec Decrypts a file, given a private key.
The cpasbe toolkit is similar to cpabe toolkit in that it supports numerical attributes
and range queries (i.e., numerical comparisons) in access policies. However, unlike
in cpabe toolkit, numerical attributes in cpasbe are treated as sets and thus cpasbe
toolkit supports multiple numerical value assignments to a given attribute in a single
private key. Thus a user with a private key generated using the following command
cannot claim any score other than 33 and 30.
$ cpasbe-keygen -o tom-priv-key pub-key master-key ’score=33’ ’score=30’ tom
An initial performance evaluation of two-level CP-ASBE using this implemen-
tation is discussed in Section 5.1.3.
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Chapter 4
Data Sharing Based on Private, Context Sensitive Policies
In many scenarios, data sharing is based on policies that include contextual
information. The scenario we consider is data sharing in the electric power grid
where power system operators need to cooperate with each other to operate the
grid safely and reliably but they also compete with each other as business entities.
Increasing power consumption and major recent events such as the August 2003
blackout [73] means the system operators are compelled to share sensitive data
to improve the reliability of the grid through wide area measurement, monitoring
and control. In deregulated grids worldwide and in the North American grid in
particular, utilities share sensitive data with their local Reliability Coordinators
(RCs) as required by regulatory laws. However, they might not be comfortable
disclosing sensitive data to other entities except under certain conditions including
transient conditions in the grid at the time of access. For example, Utility A might
be willing to share certain data, 1) with some utilities right away while with others
only after four hours have elapsed since the data is generated or 2) with any Utility
X under the jurisdiction of RC B during a frequency or voltage disturbance. In
many cases it is the context-based policy that drives the data sharing while the
number or recipients or their identities may not be known in advance. Interestingly,
it is not just the data that is sensitive but also the policies for sharing the data.
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For example, if the second policy rule in the example above involving the context
of a major transmission disturbance were to be in clear-text then anyone observing
significant network traffic with that policy might be able to conclude that a major
event has occurred. This could result in negative publicity, loss of market revenue
or an increase in attacks for Utility A. In general, policies may be sensitive because
they directly contain sensitive information, reveal information about underlying
data protected by the policy or reveal information about the data owner or the data
recipients.
An effective approach for addressing requirements for the power grid data shar-
ing problem requires techniques that go beyond the capabilities of today’s solutions
in the area. Specifically, there is a need for policy-based data sharing techniques
that support 1) multiple recipients, 2) data and policy secrecy and 3) context-based
policy enforcement. Furthermore, in order to be practical, techniques with these
properties must be efficient (in terms of key management), support flexible policy
specifications, be secure in the presence of active adversaries, and be compatible
with existing distributed networking and systems technologies. Past work in this
area has addressed only a subset of these problems. Identity Based Encryption
(IBE) [16] systems and policy-based cryptographic schemes proposed in [2, 8] allow
the association of a flexible policy with objects and support exchange in open dis-
tributed systems but do not keep the policy secret and are designed for two-party
communication where the sender identifies the recipient in the encryption. Several
works in the area of “hidden policies and credentials” [18, 33, 48] provide message
and policy secrecy but focus on two-party interactions. Attribute Based Encryption
51
(ABE) systems such as Ciphertext-Policy ABE (CP-ABE) [10, 24, 36, 49] including
our CP-ASBE scheme and cryptographic file system FSGuard [69] allow the associ-
ation of flexible policies with objects for multiple recipients defined by those policies
and support exchange in open distributed systems but do not provide policy secrecy
and cannot support context-based policies. Recent work by [55] extends CP-ABE
to support policy secrecy but significantly limits it’s policy flexibility and does not
support context-based policies. Predicate Encryption scheme proposed in [43] also
allows the association of flexible policies with objects for multiple recipients defined
by those policies, supports exchange in open distributed systems and provides pol-
icy secrecy but does not support context-based policies. PEAPOD [42] focuses on
one-to-many messaging with both message and policy secrecy but does not provide
efficient key management and is also vulnerable to collusion attacks. Policy-based
cryptography scheme in [7] is also vulnerable to collusion attacks.
In this chapter we develop an application-independent Policy Based Encryp-
tion System (PBES) that proposes a solution to this new problem of providing all
of the above-mentioned properties. We first build a new encryption scheme PKEM-
DEM (Policy and Key Encapsulation Mechanism - Data Encapsulation Mechanism)
for encrypting objects and policies and show that it is secure against adaptive chosen
ciphertext attacks in the random oracle model. The encryption scheme builds on re-
cent work in KEM-DEM hybrid encryption schemes [27]. In addition to the notions
of message indistinguishability and policy indistinguishability we define and prove
a new notion of pairwise indistinguishability where adversaries need to distinguish
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between pairs of messages and policies1. We then use this scheme to construct the
PBES system that provides the three properties mentioned above. For decryption
PBES utilizes trusted Key Distribution Centers (KDC)s that mediate decryption
of objects for recipients and enforce the policies associated with the objects. We
leverage the KDCs for policy enforcement and provide very efficient key manage-
ment as well as immediate revocation. We then discuss design issues for developing
applications using PBES; e.g., key distribution and placement of trust in KDCs.
PBES employs trusted key servers and from a systems perspective this ap-
proach is reasonable for regulated environments such as the power grid; in fact, the
grid regularly uses trusted servers for ensuring reliability and security. In terms
of encryption techniques this design approach first made it seem like the solution
might be easy, however, it turned out that was not the case. We looked at leading
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) and secure
publish/subscribe systems that typically employ trusted servers for mediated ac-
cess control but were unable to satisfy the requirements. Specifically, the require-
ments for policy secrecy and context-based policy enforcement could not be satisfied.
PBES satisfies these requirements and also provides efficiency, security and flexibil-
ity. While the scheme is motivated by the data sharing problem in the power grid,
PBES is suitable for many large-scale systems that share features with the power
grid. Regulated environments such as medical and financial information systems of-
ten employ trusted mediators that share environmental features like the power grid;
examples of trusted entities include Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
1A similar notion is independently defined and used by [55].
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(CDC) in the public health domain and the Securities and Exchange Commission in
the financial domain. Even outside regulated domains suitable application domains
include those where domains have partial trust or provide auditing capabilities of
the services provided by the trusted servers.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.1 we presents our
approach. In Section 4.2 we present the notation used and present security notions.
In Section 4.3 we present the building blocks used in our system. In Section 4.4 we
present our policy based encryption system and analyze its security in Section 4.5.
In Section 4.6 we discuss application design issues when using PBES.
4.1 Approach
4.1.1 Related Approaches
An ideal solution for the data sharing problem in the power grid would be
one that does not require trusted servers to enforce the policy. However existing
techniques that enforce the policy cryptographically and provide policy secrecy like
CP-ABE [55, 43] are not adequate as they cannot support flexible context based
policies. Furthermore, the power grid data sharing application and its properties
discussed above indicate that the presence of a Trusted Third Party (TTP) that
enforces access control is acceptable and perhaps even needed. The RCs and In-
dependent System Operators (ISOs) regularly mediate power flow and markets to
keep the system stable and provide a means for establishing TTPs for access control.
With a TTP the problem of developing an appropriate policy-based data sharing
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solution appears within reach at first in that it can leverage many existing tools
and technologies already developed in the area. However, it turns out that none of
these leading technologies can satisfy the requirements above. In particular, they are
unable to efficiently and securely provide policy secrecy and flexible context-based
policy enforcement. To show this we evaluate the suitability of Public Key Infras-
tructure tools, Role-Based Access Control systems, and secure publish-subscribe
event dissemination systems and and discuss their shortcomings.
PKI, RBAC and context-based policy enforcement . Public Key Infras-
tructure (PKI) tools with identity and attribute certificates provide data sharing
between parties with the help of trusted certificate authorities. One can design
policy-based data sharing solutions where a combination of attributes in attribute
certificates are used to specify the policy. Unfortunately, such solutions would be
vulnerable to collusion and would also fail to provide policy secrecy. RBAC sys-
tems take PKI one step forward by providing a level of indirection between users
and permissions. They achieve this by assigning users to roles via role membership
certificates and roles to permissions for access control. This indirection has been uti-
lized by several RBAC solutions such as OASIS [5] to provide context-based policy
enforcement whereby users can “activate” their roles and execute operations based
on the assumed role permissions only if certain context/environment policies (as
verified by trusted access control servers) are satisfied. If we attempt to extend such
solutions to address the requirements specified above we would face two limitations.
First, in order to ensure policy secrecy, data generators would have to specify poli-
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cies at every access control server over secure channels for every data distribution
action. Second, specifying multi-domain contexts for policy enforcement may im-
pose impractical constraints on role activation because users may need special roles
dedicated to this multi-domain data sharing application.
Secure Publish Subscribe Systems . Pub/sub systems are related to policy-
based data sharing systems discussed in this work in that publishers and subscribers
relate to data generators and consumers, and brokers in the pub/sub infrastructure
relate to servers enforcing access control policies. Research in secure pub/sub sys-
tems, in general, and those that provide content encryption, in particular, offers po-
tential solutions to the problem at hand. In essence techniques for encrypted content
distribution via pub/sub systems use symmetric keys to encrypt events with selective
attributes and then employ fully or partially trusted key servers to distribute those
keys to subscribers based on their subscriptions. To allow routing for encrypted
content these schemes may share keys with routers [4] expose certain attributes in
clear-text for routing purposes, or use encryption-matching functions [70]. Solutions
such as [4] carry over limitations of RBAC systems identified above. If we attempt to
use a secure pub/sub solution like [70] for our application we again face limitations.
First, ensuring policy secrecy for a flexible policy language requires publishers and
subscribers to maintain a large number of keys and requires the system to maintain
a significant amount of auxiliary data that allows mapping of policies with keys.
Second, the solution uses time epochs for coarse-grained revocation and the system
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Figure 4.1: Policy-based Message Encryption and Decryption
need ephemeral keys for the various transient events.
4.1.2 Our Approach - PBES
The above analysis is not intended to conclude that these existing technologies
cannot be adapted for the problem at hand. Instead, we argue with this analysis
that even with TTPs solutions to this problem are not obvious. To address this we
have developed the PBES system with a high-level architecture described in Figure
4.1. The approach satisfies the requirements of Section 3 as follows.
The system is illustrated in Figure 4.1 and contains five main components:
the data owner/sender, the object repository/relay, the Key Distribution Center
(KDC), the attribute database and the data receiver. A data owner in our system
specifies a policy pol and generates a data object o (e.g. file) that is intended for
one or more recipients satisfying the policy. The sender uses an encryption scheme
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to encrypt the object and the policy. The object repository/relay represents any
content distribution network, for example, a file server, an email relay or a publish-
subscribe system. We assume that the encrypted object contains sufficient meta-
data to allow for routing/searching of the data for intended/interested recipients
but that does not reveal the policy; e.g., keywords. Since the object is encrypted
the repository/relay need not be trusted to protect the object or enforce access
control on it. Recipients obtain the encrypted object from this repository/relay
via available pull/push mechanisms. Once a recipient gets the encrypted object it
contacts the KDC to obtain the object decryption key. The KDC may contact an
Attribute Database that manages user attributes and privileges and keeps track of
environmental attributes. The Attribute Database abstracted here is a logical entity
and in practice may be composed of multiple databases/services.
There are key design choices here that affect the efficiency, security, flexibility
and compatibility. We require that the object and the policy be encrypted and
stored together but that they be separable for decryption purposes. This improves
efficiency because on the sender side the sender need not specify the policy at mul-
tiple servers (KDCs) that may be trusted with policy enforcement and on the the
receiver side the receiver need not send the encrypted object (which could be large)
to the KDC for policy enforcement and decryption. We associate the object and
policy with a key rather than generate the key from the policy. This allows for
considerable flexibility and compatibility as any policy language may be used; e.g.,
one that is already used by the application for other purposes. While there are a
range of potential languages and tools we believe that tools based on XACML are
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a good candidate for PBES. The approach for associating data and policies with
keys, however, imposes the need for an encryption scheme that is secure against
active adversaries. In the absence of this adversaries may be able to manipulate the
encrypted objects and policies stored at the repository in unauthorized ways; e.g.,
associate a new object with an existing policy or vice-versa. To that end we develop
a PKEM-DEM hybrid encryption that provides adequate security for PBES.
4.2 Notation and Security Notions
We first introduce some common notation used throughout this chapter. We
then define formal notions of security for a policy-based encryption scheme for mul-
tiple recipients with policy secrecy.
Notation Bit strings are denoted using small case letters, x, and the length of
such strings is denoted by |x|. Sets are denoted using capital case letters, S, and the
size of the such sets is denoted by |S|. s $←− S denotes the operation of picking an
element s of S uniformly at random. Adversaries are represented by probabilistic
polynomial-time (PPT) algorithms A. ν $←− A(α1, α2, . . . αk) denotes the action of
running the PPT algorithm A with input (α1, α2, . . . αk) and letting v be the output.
AO1,O2,...,Ol(α1, α2, . . . αk) denotes a PPT adversary with input (α1, α2, . . . αk) and
access to oracles O1,O2, . . . ,Ol. Let E denote a policy-based encryption scheme for
multiple recipients with policy secrecy.
Given that we want to protect both message and policy secrecy we define
the notions of message indistinguishability and policy indistinguishability against
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Figure 4.2: Encryption in PKEM-DEM scheme instantiated using RSA-KEM and
DEM1
adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks similar to the ones defined in [42].
Definition 4.1. Message Indistinguishability
E has message indistinguishability against an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack
if the guessing advantage, of any PPT adversary, A = (A1,A2), as defined below is
negligible.
AdvE−msg−ind−cca2E,A (k) =
∣∣∣Pr [GE−msg−ind−cca2E,A (k) = b]− 1/2∣∣∣
where GE−msg−ind−cca2E,A (k) is the game described below:
Setup The environment generates a key-pair (sk, pk) and gives pk to A.
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Phase 1 A1 is provided with a decryption oracle for E with above generated key-
pair. It is also allowed to arbitrarily and adaptively add/corrupt users. That is
it can get access to arbitrary sets of attributes represented by corrupted users
ui.
Challenge A1 outputs two messages, m0, m1 of equal length, a policy p of his
choice and some state information St with the following restriction:
Restriction 1: None of the corrupted users satisfy the policy p throughout the
game.
The environment then picks a random bit, b
$←− {0, 1}, and encrypts message
mb under policy p and returns the challenge ciphertext C
∗ along with St to
A2.
Phase 2 A2 is provided with a decryption oracle for E with above generated key-pair
and is allowed to do everything A1 is allowed in Phase 1 with the constraint
that Restriction 1 must be satisfied and that it cannot query the decryption
oracle on C∗.
Output A2 outputs his guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}. A wins if b′ = b.
That is, an adversary cannot distinguish between encryptions of two messages
under a given policy. Restriction 1 is needed because otherwise the adversary can
trivially win the game by decrypting the challenge ciphertext as he has access to
keying material of a user who satisfies the policy.
Definition 4.2. Policy Indistinguishability
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E has policy indistinguishability against an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack
if the guessing advantage, of any PPT adversary, A = (A1,A2), as defined below is
negligible.
AdvE−pol−ind−cca2E,A (k) =
∣∣∣Pr [GȨ−pol−ind−cca2E,A (k) = b]− 1/2∣∣∣
where GE−pol−ind−cca2E,A (k) is the game described below:
Setup The environment generates a key-pair (sk, pk) and gives pk to A.
Phase 1 A1 is provided with a decryption oracle for E with above generated key-
pair. It is also allowed to arbitrarily and adaptively add/corrupt users. That is
it can get access to arbitrary sets of attributes represented by corrupted users
ui.
Challenge A1 outputs state information St, a message, m, and two policies p0,
p1 of equal length satisfying one of the following restrictions:
Restriction 2a: All of the corrupted users satisfy both policies p0 and p1
throughout the game. OR
Restriction 2b: None of the corrupted users satisfy either policy p0 or policy
p1 throughout the game.
The environment then picks a random bit, b
$←− {0, 1}, and encrypts message
m under policy pb and returns the challenge ciphertext (C
∗) along with St to
A2.
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Phase 2 A2 is provided with a decryption oracle access for E and is allowed to do
everything A1 is allowed in Phase 1 with the constraint that either Restriction
2a or 2b must be satisfied and that it cannot query the decryption oracle on
C∗.
Output A2 outputs his guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}. A wins if b′ = b.
That is, an adversary cannot distinguish between encryptions of a given mes-
sage under two policies. Restriction 2a or 2b is needed because otherwise the ad-
versary can trivially win the game by picking two policies such that he (i.e., one of
the corrupted users) satisfies one of them and not the other.
We now define a security notion called pairwise indistinguishability for pairs
(m0, pol0), (m1, pol1) which is motivated by the following scenario. Let us say an
adversary knows that either message “Buy” is encrypted under policy “Aggressive”
or message “Sell” is encrypted under policy “Moderate” (where “Aggressive” and
“Moderate” are known investor profiles) but doesn’t know which action is being
recommended by a paid investment service.
Definition 4.3. Pairwise Indistinguishability
E has pairwise indistinguishability against an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack
if the guessing advantage, of any PPT adversary, A = (A1,A2), as defined below is
negligible.
AdvE−pw−ind−cca2E,A (k) =
∣∣∣Pr [GE−pw−ind−cca2E,A (k) = b]− 1/2∣∣∣
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where GE−pw−ind−cca2E,A (k) is the game described below:
Setup The environment generates a key-pair (sk, pk) and gives pk to A.
Phase 1 A1 is provided with a decryption oracle for E with above generated key-
pair. It is also allowed to arbitrarily and adaptively add/corrupt users. That is
it can get access to arbitrary sets of attributes represented by corrupted users
ui.
Challenge A outputs two messages, m0, m1, of equal length and two policies p0,
p1, of equal length along with state information St under the following restric-
tion:
Restriction 3: None of the corrupted users satisfy either policy p0 or p1 through-
out the game.
The environment then picks a random bit, b
$←− {0, 1}, and encrypts message
mb under policy pb and returns the challenge ciphertext (C
∗) along with state
information St to A2.
Phase 2 A2 is provided with a decryption oracle for E and is allowed to do every-
thing A1 is allowed in Phase 1 with the constraints that Restriction 3 must be
satisfied and that it cannot query the decryption oracle on C∗.
Output A2 outputs his guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}. A wins if b′ = b.
That is, an adversary cannot distinguish between encryptions of two message
and policy pairs. Restriction 3 is needed because otherwise the adversary can triv-
ially win the game by decrypting the challenge ciphertext as he has access to keying
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material of a user who satisfies the policy. By definition, pairwise indistinguish-
ability implies message indistinguishability (when both policies are the same) and
policy indistinguishability with restriction 2b (when both messages are the same)
and hence is a stronger notion of security. Furthermore, we note that using stan-
dard hybrid argument one can show that message indistinguishability together with
policy indistinguishability (with restriction 2b) imply pairwise indistinguishability.
In all the above definitions the adversary is allowed to corrupt multiple users and
obtain their keying material thus user-collusion attacks are taken into account.
4.3 Building Blocks
Our encryption scheme is based on the KEM-DEM hybrid encryption para-
digm. We now introduce some crypto primitives that will be used to build our
scheme and define associated security notions.
4.3.1 Key Encapsulation Mechanism
A public-key based key encapsulation mechanism (KEM), consists of the
following three algorithms: KEM.KeyGen, KEM.Encrypt and KEM.Decrypt.
KEM.KeyGen is a PPT algorithm that takes as input a security parameter, k ∈ N,
and outputs a key pair (sk, pk), i.e., (sk, pk)
$←− KEM.KeyGen(1k). KEM.Encrypt
is a PPT algorithm that takes as input a security parameter, k ∈ N, and a
public-key, pk, generated by KEM.KeyGen and outputs a pair (K,C), where K ∈
{0, 1}KEM.KeyLen(k) is a key, KEM.KeyLen(k) is key-length and C is a ciphertext,
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i.e., (K,C)
$←− KEM.Encrypt(1k, pk). KEM.Decrypt is a deterministic polynomial-
time algorithm that takes as input a secret-key, sk, and ciphertext, C, and returns
either a key K or a rejection symbol ⊥, i.e., {K,⊥} ← KEM.Decrypt(sk, C). For
correctness, we require that ∀k ∈ N, and ∀(sk, pk) $←− KEM.KeyGen(1k) we have
KEM.Decrypt(sk, C) = K for any (K,C)
$←− KEM.Encrypt(1k, pk).
We define the notion of indistinguishability for KEMs against an adaptive
chosen ciphertext attack (CCA2) as established in [27].
Definition 4.4. Let A = (A1,A2) be a PPT CCA2 adversary. We define the
guessing advantage of A as follows:
Advkem−ind−cca2KEM, A (k) =




$←− KEM.KeyGen(1k); St $←− ADEC(.)1 (pk)
b




$←− KEM.Encrypt(1k, pk); K∗ $←− K∗b
b′
$←− ADEC(.)2 (pk, C∗, K∗, St); Return b′
and oracle DEC(.) is defined as KEM.Decrypt(sk, .) with the condition that the
oracle rejects queries on C∗ after the target ciphertext is given to the adversary.
That is, given a ciphertext and key pair an adversary cannot tell whether the
given key is the one encapsulated by the ciphertext or a random one.
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4.3.2 Data Encapsulation Mechanism
A data encapsulation mechanism (DEM) is a symmetric key encryption scheme
and consists of the following three algorithms: DEM.KeyGen, DEM.Encrypt and
DEM.Decrypt. DEM.KeyGen is a PPT algorithm that takes as input a secu-
rity parameter, k ∈ N, and outputs a key K, i.e., K $←− DEM.KeyGen(1k).
DEM.Encrypt is a polynomial-time algorithm that takes as input a message , m,
and a key, K, generated by DEM.KeyGen and outputs a ciphertext C, i.e., C
$←−
DEM.Encrypt(m,K). DEM.Decrypt is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm
that takes as input a key, K, and ciphertext, C, and returns either the message m
or a rejection symbol ⊥, i.e., {m,⊥} ← DEM.Decrypt(K,C). For correctness, we
require that ∀k ∈ N, ∀K $←− DEM.KeyGen(1k) and ∀m we have
DEM.Decrypt(K,DEM.Encrypt(m,K)) = m
We define the notion of indistinguishability for a DEM against a one-time
attack (OT) and a one-time adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (OTCCA) as estab-
lished in [27].
Definition 4.5. Let A = (A1,A2) be a PPT adversary. We define the guessing
advantage of A as follows:
Advdem−ind−atkDEM,A (k) =








$←− {0, 1}; C∗ $←− DEM.Encrypt(mb, K)
b′
$←− ADEC(.)2 (C∗, St); Return b′
and oracle DEC(.) is defined as ε in the OT attack case and as DEM.Decrypt(K, .)
in the OTCCA case with the condition that the oracle rejects queries on C∗ after
the target ciphertext is give to the adversary.
That is, an adversary cannot distinguish between the encryption of two mes-
sages. Note thatA1 does not have access to an encryption oracle as this is a one-time
scheme, i.e., the key is used for only one encryption.
KEM-DEM schemes are hybrid encryption schemes where the key generated by
the KEM scheme is used by the DEM for data encapsulation. KEM-DEM schemes
were shown to be secure [67, 38, 27]. The result is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. If KEM is secure against an adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks and
DEM is secure against one-time adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks then the hybrid
encryption scheme KEM-DEM is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks.
Specifically, if A is a PPT adversary, then there exist PPT adversaries B1 and B2,






KEM,B1 (k) + Adv
dem−ind−otcca
DEM,B2 (k)
4.3.3 Policy and Key Encapsulation Mechanism
A policy and key encapsulation mechanism (PKEM) is an encapsulation mech-
anism, which we define to encapsulate both a key and a policy. Similar to a KEM a
PKEM consists of three algorithms, namely, PKEM.KeyGen, PKEM.Encrypt and
PKEM.Decrypt and it provides the following interface. PKEM.KeyGen is a PPT
algorithm that takes as input a security parameter, k ∈ N, and outputs a key pair
(sk, pk), i.e., (sk, pk)
$←− PKEM.KeyGen(1k). PKEM.Encrypt is a PPT algorithm
that takes as input a bit string from the message space (interpreted as a policy),
pol, and a public-key, pk, generated by PKEM.KeyGen and outputs a pair (K,C),
where K ∈ {0, 1}PKEM.KeyLen(k) is a key (KEM.KeyLen(k) is key-length) and C is
a ciphertext, i.e., (K,C)
$←− KEM.Encrypt(pk, pol). PKEM.Decrypt is a determin-
istic polynomial-time algorithm that takes as input a secret-key, sk, and ciphertext,
C, and returns either key and policy pair (K, pol) or a rejection symbol ⊥, i.e.,
{(K, pol),⊥} ← PKEM.Decrypt(sk, C). For correctness, we require that ∀k ∈ N,
and ∀(sk, pk) $←− KEM.KeyGen(1k) we have PKEM.Decrypt(sk, C) = (K, pol)
for any (K,C)
$←− PKEM.Encrypt(pk, pol).
Given that a PKEM encapsulates both a key and policy we define two notions
of indistinguishability for a PKEM against an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack,
viz , key indistinguishability and policy indistinguishability. We define each of them
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as follows.
Definition 4.6. Key Indistinguishability. Let A = (A1,A2) be a PPT CCA2
adversary. We define the guessing advantage of A as follows:
Advpkem−key−ind−cca2PKEM, A (k) =
∣∣∣Pr [Gpkem−key−ind−cca2PKEM,A (k) = b]− 1/2∣∣∣
where
Game Gpkem−key−ind−cca2PKEM,A (k) :
(sk, pk)
$←− PKEM.KeyGen(1k); (St, pol) $←− ADEC(.)1 (pk)
b




$←− PKEM.Encrypt(pk, pol); K∗ $←− K∗b
b′
$←− ADEC(.)2 (pk, C∗, K∗, St); Return b′
and oracle DEC(.) is defined as PKEM.Decrypt(sk, .) with the condition that the
oracle rejects queries on C∗ after the target ciphertext is given to the adversary.
Definition 4.7. Policy Indistinguishability. Let A = (A1,A2) be a PPT CCA2
adversary. We define the guessing advantage of A as follows:
Advpkem−pol−ind−cca2PKEM, A (k) =
∣∣∣Pr [Gpkem−pol−ind−cca2PKEM,A (k) = b]− 1/2∣∣∣
where
Game Gpkem−pol−ind−cca2PKEM,A (k) :
(sk, pk)
$←− PKEM.KeyGen(1k); (St, pol0, pol1)
$←− ADEC(.)1 (pk)
b
$←− {0, 1}; (K∗, C∗) $←− PKEM.Encrypt(pk, polb)
b′
$←− ADEC(.)2 (pk, (K∗, C∗), St); Return b′
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and oracle DEC(.) is defined as PKEM.Decrypt(sk, .) with the condition that the
oracle rejects queries on C∗ after the target ciphertext is given to the adversary.
A symmetric-key based PKEM (SPKEM) is similar to the public-key based
PKEM described above except that a symmetric key is used instead of the asymmet-
ric key-pair. Notions of key and policy indistinguishability for SPKEM are defined
similarly to that of PKEM except that they are defined for an OTCCA adversary,
i.e., the adversary doesn’t get access to encryption oracle in the first phase. We
construct a SPKEM using a DEM as shown below and then build a PKEM using
SPKEM and KEM.
SPKEM.Encrypt(pol,K) : SPKEM.Decrypt(K, C)) :
K ′
$←− DEM.KeyGen(1k) m′ ← DEM.Decrypt(K, C)
m′ ← pol‖K ′ if m′ =⊥ or parsing m′
C ← DEM.Encrypt(m′,K) as pol‖K ′ fails return ⊥
Return (K ′, C) else Return (pol,K ′)
where K is generated by DEM.KeyGen(1K).
This scheme is secure against OTCCA attacks on key and policy indisting-
uishability as stated by the following theorems.
Theorem 4.2. If DEM is secure against one-time adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks
(OTCCA) on (message) indistinguishability then SPKEM is secure against one-time
adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (OTCCA) on key indistinguishability.
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In particular, for every PPT adversary A, there exists a PPT adversary B whose
running time is essentially the same as that of A such that for all k ∈ N, we have
Advspkem−key−ind−cca2SPKEM, A (k) = Adv
dem−ind−cca2
DEM,B (k) (4.1)
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Adversary B runs adversary A and accurately simulates a
SPKEM game environment as follows. When A outputs a policy pol and requests
challenge key and ciphertext pair, (K∗, C∗), B does the following. It generates two
random keys K0 and K1 for the underlying DEM scheme and creates two messages
m0 = pol‖K0 and m1 = pol‖K1 and outputs them to its DEM game environment
and gets the challenge ciphertext C∗ = DEM.Encrypt(mb, K) back. B gives A the
following challenge key and ciphertext pair (K1, C
∗). B forwards any decryption
queries A has to the decryption oracle it has access to and parses the output as
pol‖K before returning it A. B outputs the guess bit that A outputs. Note that
when b = 1, A gets the real key and when b = 0, A gets the random key. So if A
outputs 1 when b = 1 or if A outputs 0 when b = 0 then A is successful by design.
Success probability of adversary B, Pr[Advdem−ind−otccaDEM,B (k) = b] is,
= 1/2 · Pr[Advdem−ind−otccaDEM,B (k) = 1|b = 1]+
1/2 · Pr[Advdem−ind−otccaDEM,B (k) = 0|b = 0]
= 1/2 · Pr[Advspkem−key−ind−otccaSPKEM,A (k) = 1|b = 1]+
1/2 · Pr[Advspkem−key−ind−otccaSPKEM,A (k) = 0|b = 0]
= Pr[Advspkem−key−ind−otccaSPKEM,A (k) = b]
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Theorem 4.3. If DEM is secure against one-time adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks
(OTCCA) on (message) indistinguishability then SPKEM is secure against one-time
adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (OTCCA) on policy indistinguishability.
In particular, for every PPT adversary A, there exists a PPT adversary B whose
running time is essentially the same as that of A such that for all k ∈ N, we have
Advspkem−pol−ind−cca2SPKEM, A (k) = Adv
dem−ind−cca2
DEM,B (k) (4.2)
Proof of Theorem 4.3. Adversary B simply runs A. On receiving pol1 and pol2 from
A, B generates a random key, K∗, for the underlying DEM scheme, sends pol1‖K∗
and pol2‖K∗ to its DEM game environment and returns the target ciphertext it
receives to A. For decryption queries from A, B queries its own decryption oracle,
parses the reply (if not ⊥) as pol and K and returns it to A. When A outputs a
guess B outputs the same value. Clearly, B accurately simulates the SPKEM game
environment forA. Thus any advantageA has in breaking policy indistinguishability
of SPKEM is translated into advantage in breaking (message) indistinguishability
of DEM.
We now construct a PKEM scheme using a SPKEM and a KEM as follows:
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PKEM.KeyGen(1k) : PKEM.Decrypt(sk, C) :
(sk, pk) $←− KEM.KeyGen(1k) parse C as C1‖C2
Return (sk, pk) K1 ← KEM.Decrypt(sk, C1)
PKEM.Encrypt(pol, pk) : if K1 6=⊥
(K1, C1)
$←− KEM.Encrypt(1k, pk) m′ ← SPKEM.Decrypt(K1, C2)
(K2, C2)
$←− SPKEM.Encrypt(pol,K1) if m′ =⊥ return ⊥
C ← C1‖C2 else Return m′ = (pol,K2)
Return (K2, C)
The above PKEM scheme is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks
on both key and policy indistinguishability. In particular, the following theorems
hold.
Theorem 4.4. If KEM and SPKEM schemes are secure against adaptive chosen
ciphertext attacks on key indistinguishability then PKEM is secure against adaptive
chosen ciphertext attacks on key indistinguishability.
In particular, for every PPT adversary A, there exist PPT adversaries B1 and B2,
whose running times are essentially the same as that of A, such that for all k ∈ N,
we have,
Advpkem−key−ind−cca2PKEM, A (k) ≤





Proof of Theorem 4.4. Let G0 be the original attack game defined by Definition 4.6.
Fix A and k and let C∗ = (C∗1 , C∗2) denote the target ciphertext. Let E0 denote the
event that b′ = b in G0 so that
Advpkem−key−ind−cca2PKEM,A (k) = |Pr[E0]− 1/2| (4.4)
We shall define two modified attack games G1 and G2. Each of the games
G0,G1,G2 operates on the same underlying probability space. That is, the crypto-
graphic keys, coin tosses of A and hidden bit b take identical values across all games.
However the games differ in how the environment responds to oracle queries. Let Ei
be the event that b′ = b in game Gi for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2.
Game G1 In this game whenever a ciphertext (C1, C2) is submitted to the
decryption oracle after the invocation of the encryption oracle, if C1 = C
∗
1 but
C2 6= C∗2 , then the decryption oracle does not apply KEM.Decrypt to obtain the
symmetric key but uses K∗1 produced by the encryption oracle instead. This is just
a conceptual change and
Pr[E0] = Pr[E1] (4.5)
Game G2 This game is similar to the game G1 except that a completely
random key, K†1, is used in place of K
∗
1 in both encryption and decryption oracles.
Any difference in the success probability of A against games G1 and G2 can be
leveraged to construct an adversary algorithm that can break CCA security of KEM.
More precisely we have:
Lemma 4.8. There exists a probabilistic algorithm B1 whose running time is essen-
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tially the same as that of A, such that
|Pr[E1]− Pr[E2]| = 2 ·Advkem−ind−cca2KEM,B1 (k) (4.6)
Furthermore, in game G2, since a random key, K
†
1, independent of the one en-
capsulated by C∗1 , is used to produce the target ciphertext C
∗
2 and by the decryption
oracle, A is essentially carrying out a one-time adaptive chosen ciphertext attack
against the SPKEM scheme described above. Thus we have
|Pr[E2]− 1/2| = Advspkem−key−ind−cca2SPKEM, A (k) (4.7)
The theorem now follows from equations 4.4, 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7.
Proof of Lemma 4.8. In the game against KEM, B is given public-key, pk, and access
to a decryption oracle for KEM. B runsA with the public-key pk. Decryption queries
from A are answered by B using the decryption oracle. When A outputs a policy pol
and asks for the challenge key and ciphertext pair, B does the following: 1) it gets
a challenge key and ciphertext pair, (K∗, C∗1), from the KEM game environment,
2) it generates two random keys, K0 and K1for the underlying DEM, 3) picks a
bit b
$←− {0, 1} and 4) computes C∗2 = DEM.Encrypt((pol‖K1), K∗) and gives the




2)) to A. Here K∗ is the key encapsulated by C∗1 if δ = 1
or a random key if δ = 0 where δ
$←− {0, 1} is chosen by KEM game environment.
For decryption queries from A in the second phase, if C1 = C∗1 , B uses K∗ to decrypt
C2 otherwise it uses the decryption oracle for KEM. If A outputs a guess bit b′ = b
then B outputs δ′ = 1 else it outputs δ′ = 0. Note that when δ = 1 A is in game
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G1 and when δ = 0 A is in game G2. Therefore Pr[b′ = b|δ = 1] = Pr[E1] and
Pr[b′ = b|δ = 0] = Pr[E2].
Pr[δ′ = δ]− 1/2 =1/2 · |Pr[δ′ = 1|δ = 1]− Pr[δ′ = 1|δ = 0]|
= 1/2 · |Pr[b′ = b|δ = 1]− Pr[b′ = b|δ = 0]|
= 1/2 · |Pr[E1]− Pr[E2]|
But Pr[δ′ = δ]− 1/2 = Advkem−ind−cca2KEM,B1 (k) therefore
|Pr[E1]− Pr[E2]| = 2 ·Advkem−ind−cca2KEM,B1 (k)
Theorem 4.5. If the underlying KEM and SPKEM schemes are secure against
adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks on key and policy indistinguishability, respec-
tively, then PKEM is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks on policy
indistinguishability.
In particular, for every PPT adversary A, there exists a PPT adversary B1 and B2,
whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for all k ∈ N, we
have,
Advpkem−pol−ind−cca2PKEM, A (k) =




Proof Sketch of Theorem 4.5. This proof very similar to that of Theorem 4.4 above
except that in Game G2 the adversary is launching an OTCCA attack against policy
indistinguishability of SPKEM instead of key indistingusiahbility.
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4.4 Policy Based Encryption System
Our encryption scheme is based on KEM-DEM hybrid encryption paradigm [27]
and uses Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) and Data Encapsulation Mechanism
(DEM) as building blocks. For ease of exposition we define and use a construction
Policy and Key Encapsulation Mechanism (PKEM) to build our scheme dubbed
PKEM-DEM. In our PKEM-DEM encryption scheme a file/message, m, is encap-
sulated using a DEM where the key used by the DEM and the policy associated
with the message, pol, are encapsulated using PKEM as defined below.
PKEM-DEM.KeyGen(1k) : PKEM-DEM.Decrypt-I(sk, f, C1, u) :
(sk, pk) $←− PKEM.KeyGen(1k) m′ ← PKEM.Decrypt(sk, C1)
Return (sk, pk) if m′ =⊥ Return ⊥
else parse m′ as (pol,K2)
PKEM-DEM.Encrypt(m, pol, pk) : if f(u, pol) = 1 Return K2
(K2, C1)
$←− PKEM.Encrypt(pol, pk) else Return ⊥
C2 ← DEM.Encrypt(m,K2) PKEM-DEM.Decrypt-II(K2, C2) :
C ← C1‖C2 if K2 =⊥ Return ⊥
Return C m← DEM.Decrypt(K2, C2)
Return m
Here, u represents a user and his associated attributes along with contextual
attributes and f represents the policy evaluation function and is a deterministic
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polynomial-time function that takes as input u, and a policy, pol, and returns a 1
if the user along with context satisfies the policy or a 0 otherwise. A PKEM-DEM
scheme can be constructed using any KEM and DEM where the two schemes are
independent2. Figure 4.2 shows encryption in PKEM-DEM scheme instantiated
using RSA-KEM and DEM1 defined in [27]
We use our PKEM-DEM encryption scheme to develop the PBES policy based
encryption system whose architecture is illustrated in Figure 4.1 and described in
Section 4.1.2. The data owner in our system specifies a policy pol and uses the
PKEM-DEM scheme to securely associate the policy with the data m and generate
an encrypted object E(o) that hides both the policy and the data. In order to do
so it chooses a KDC that it trusts to enforce the policy and release the DEM object
encryption key to recipient(s) that satisfy the policy. It then obtains the public key
of the KDC, PK, via a trusted source (e.g., a Certificate Authority − CA) and
encrypts the object using the PKEM-DEM scheme.
Once a recipient obtains the encrypted object it must contact the KDC rep-
resented by the public key PK in the encrypted object in order to obtain the DEM
object decryption key. To do so it initiates a protected transaction (e.g., over TLS)
with the KDC and submits the PKEM part of the encrypted object (i.e., it excludes
the encrypted object in the DEM part). The KDC then contacts the Attribute
Database that manages user attributes and privileges and enviromental attributes
(i.e., context). The KDC uses these attributes of the user and the environment and
2KEM-DEM schemes built using secure KEM and secure DEM that are related may not be
secure as shown in [38]
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the PKEM part of the object as inputs to PKEM-DEM.Decrypt-I to obtain the
DEM keys. The KDC releases the object decryption key, K, to the recipient and
the recipient uses this key to decrypt the object using PKEM-DEM.Decrypt-II.
4.5 Security Analysis
Since pairwise indistinguishability (in Def. 4.3) implies message indistinguish-
ability (in Def. 4.1) and policy indistinguishability (in Def. 4.2) with restriction
2b, we prove that PKEM-DEM is pairwise indistinguishable in Theorem 4.6 and
that it is policy indistinguishable with restriction 2a in Theorem 4.7 to show that
PKEM-DEM system is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks.
In the proofs for the following Theorems, decryption oracle for PKEM-DEM
executes PKEM-DEM.Decrypt-I and PKEM-DEM.Decrypt-II on the decryption
query and returns the output of both the algorithms to the adversary.
Theorem 4.6. If DEM is secure against one-time chosen ciphertext attacks and
PKEM is secure against chosen ciphertext attacks against both key and policy in-
distinguishability then PKEM-DEM is secure against chosen ciphertext attacks on
pairwise indistinguishability as given in Definition 4.3.
In particular we have
Advpkem−dem−pw−ind−cca2PKEM-DEM (k) ≤




Proof of Theorem 4.6. Let G0 be the original attack game, i.e., G
pkem−dem−ind−cca2
PKEM-DEM,A (k),
described in Definition 4.3. Fix A and k and let C∗ = (C∗1 , C∗2) denote the target
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ciphertext. Let E0 denote the event that b′ = b in G0 so that
Advpkem−dem−ind−cca2−cuPKEM-DEM,A (k) = |Pr[E0]− 1/2| (4.10)
We shall define two modified attack games G1 and G2. Each of the games
G0,G1,G2 operates on the same underlying probability space. That is, the crypto-
graphic keys, coin tosses of A and hidden bit b take identical values across all games.
However, the games differ in how the environment responds to oracle queries. Let
Ei be the event that b′ = b in game Gi for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2.
Game G1 In this game whenever a ciphertext (C1, C2) is submitted to the
decryption oracle after the invocation of the encryption oracle, if C1 = C
∗
1 but
C2 6= C∗2 , then the decryption oracle does not apply PKEM.Decrypt to obtain the
symmetric key but uses K∗2 produced by the encryption oracle instead. This is just
a conceptual change and
Pr[E0] = Pr[E1] (4.11)
Game G2 This game is similar to the game G1 except that a completely
random key, K†2, is used in place of K
∗
2 in both encryption and decryption oracles.
Any difference in the success probability of A against games G1 and G2 can be
leveraged to construct an adversary algorithm that can break key indistinguishability
of PKEM. More precisely we have:
Lemma 4.9. There exists a probabilistic algorithm B1 whose running time is essen-
tially the same as that of A, such that
|Pr[E1]− Pr[E2]| = 2 ·Advpkem−key−ind−cca2PKEM,B1 (k) (4.12)
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We observe that in game G2, message mb is encapsulated with a DEM using a
key, K†2, that is independent of the one encapsulated by PKEM. Thus, in game G2,
adversary A is essentially carrying out one-time adaptive chosen ciphertext attack
against an instance of DEM or an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack on the policy
indistinguishability against an instance of PKEM. Specifically, we have:
Lemma 4.10. There exists probabilistic algorithms B2 and B3 whose running times
(and number of decryption queries) are at most twice that of A, such that
|Pr[E3]− 1/2| ≤




The theorem now follows from equations 4.10, 4.11, 4.12 and 4.13.
We now give proofs of Lemmas 4.9 and 4.10 to complete the proof of Theorem
4.6.
Proof of Lemma 4.9. B1 is an adversary against key indistinguishability of PKEM
and is given public-key, pk, and access to a decryption oracle for PKEM. B1 runs
A with the public-key pk. When adversary A adds/corrupts a user, ui, B1 stores
the user ui and associated attributes in a list. Decryption queries, C = (C1, C2),
with privileges of user ui from A are answered by B1 as follows: 1) B1 submits C1
to its PKEM oracle and gets either a ⊥ or (pol,K2), 2) if ⊥, it returns ⊥ to A, 3)
else, if f(ui, pol) = 1 returns K2 and DEM.Decrypt(K2, C2) otherwise it returns
⊥. When A outputs a message and policy pairs (m0,m1) and (pol1, pol2) and asks
for the challenge ciphertext, B1 does the following: 1) verifies that none of the of
the corrupted users ui satisfies either pol0 or pol1, 2) picks a bit b
$←− {0, 1}, 3) gives
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polb to the PKEM game environment and gets a challenge key and ciphertext pair,
(K∗, C∗1), and 4) computes C
∗
2 = DEM.Encrypt(mb, K
∗) and gives the challenge
pair (C∗1 , C
∗
2) to A. Here K∗ is the key encapsulated by C∗1 if δ = 1 or a random
key if δ = 0 where δ
$←− {0, 1} is chosen by PKEM game environment. In the second
phase, when A adds/corrupts a user ui, B1 verifies that ui does not satisfy either pol0
or pol1. To answer decryption queries, C = (C1, C2) from A in the second phase,
B1 uses the decryption oracle for PKEM as described above. Note that if A asks
queries where C1 = C
∗
1 then B1 returns ⊥ since none of the users compromised by
A satisfy either pol1 or pol2. If A outputs a guess bit b′ = b then B1 outputs δ′ = 1
else it outputs δ′ = 0. Note that when δ = 1 A is in game G1 and when δ = 0 A
is in game G2. Therefore Pr[b
′ = b|δ = 1] = Pr[E1] and Pr[b′ = b|δ = 0] = Pr[E2].
Then,
Pr[δ′ = δ]− 1/2 =1/2 ·
∣∣Pr[δ′ = 1|δ = 1]− Pr[δ′ = 1|δ = 0]∣∣
= 1/2 ·
∣∣Pr[b′ = b|δ = 1]− Pr[b′ = b|δ = 0]∣∣
= 1/2 · |Pr[E1]− Pr[E2]|
But Pr[δ′ = δ]− 1/2 = Advpkem−key−ind−cca2PKEM,B1 (k) therefore
|Pr[E1]− Pr[E2]| = 2 ·Advpkem−key−ind−cca2PKEM,B1 (k)
Proof of Lemma 4.10. Let probability of success of A = (A1,A2) in game G2 be
1/2 + ε. Then, |Pr[E2]− 1/2| = ε. Furthermore, let 1/2 + α be the probability
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that A outputs 1 when the challenge ciphertext it is given encrypts m0 and pol1
and 1/2 + β be the probability that A outputs 1 when the challenge ciphertext it is
given encrypts m1 and pol0.
Part 1. B2 is OTCCA adversary against (message) indistinguishability of
DEM that runs A. In particular, B2 generates a KEM key pair, (sk, pk), and runs
one instance of A1 giving it pk and two instances of A2 (i.e., A2,0 and A2,1 ) with
different challenge ciphertexts as follows. Phase 1 queries of A1 are answered similar
to the way described in proof of Lemma 4.9 above except that B2 has access to sk.
WhenA1 outputs a message pair (m0,m1) and policy pair (pol0, pol1) and state infor-
mation St, B2 does the following: 1) verifies that none of the of the corrupted users ui
satisfies either pol0 or pol1, 2) gives the pair (m0,m1) to the DEM game environment
and obtains the challenge ciphertext C∗2 = DEM.Encrypt(mδ, Kdem), 2) computes
the following C∗1,0 = PKEM.Encrypt(pol0, pk), C
∗
1,1 = PKEM.Encrypt(pol1, pk)
and 3) runs A2,0 with (C∗1,0, C∗2) and A2,1 with (C∗1,1, C∗2) as the challenge cipher-
texts. Phase 2 queries of A2 are answered just like phase 1 except, 1) when A2
adds/corrupts a user ui, B2 verifies that ui does not satisfy either pol0 or pol1 and
2) when decryption query of A2,ψ has C1 = C∗1,ψ in which case B2 returns ⊥ as the
adversary does not satisfy either of the policies. Let A2,0’s output be b0 and A2,1’s
output be b1. B2 outputs δ′ = b0 if b0 = b1 and outputs δ′ = bθ otherwise, where
θ














Pr[b0 = 0 ∧ b1 = 0|δ = 0] + Pr[θ = 0 ∧ b0 = 0 ∧ b1 = 1|δ = 0]




Pr[b0 = 1 ∧ b1 = 1|δ = 1]
+Pr[θ = 0 ∧ b0 = 1 ∧ b1 = 0|δ = 1]






























































But |Pr[δ′ = δ]− 1/2| = Advdem−ind−cca2DEM,B2 (k) = εDEM (say) therefore we have




Part 2. B3 is CCA adversary against policy indistinguishability of PKEM
that runs A. B3 is constructed similarly to B2 with obvious modifications.
In particular, B4 generates a KEM keypair, (sk, pk), and runs one instance of
A1 giving it pk and two instances of A2 (i.e., A2,0 and A2,1 ) with different chal-
lenge ciphertexts Decryption queries of A1 are answered in the obvious way using sk.
When A1 ouputs a message pair (m0,m1) and policy pair (pol0, pol1) and state infor-
mation St, B4 does the following: 1) gives the pair (pol0, pol1) to the SPKEM game
environment and obtains the challenge ciphertext C∗2 = DEM.Encrypt((pol0‖K ′), KSPKEM),
2) generates a random DEM keysK and computes the following C∗3,0 = DEM.Encrypt(m0, K),
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C∗3,1 = DEM.Encrypt(m1, K) and (K
∗, C∗1) = KEM.Encrypt(1
k, pk) and 3) runs
A2,0 with (C∗1 , C∗2 , C∗3,0) and A2,1 with (C∗1 , C∗2 , C∗3,1) as the challenge ciphertexts. To
answer decryption queries, C = (C1, C2, C3) from A in the second phase, if C1 = C∗1 ,
B uses decryption oracle provided by SPKEM environment to decrypt C2 otherwise
it uses sk. Let A2,0’s output be b0 and A2,1’s output be b1. B4 outputs δ′ = b0
if b0 = b1 and outputs δ
′ = bθ otherwise, where θ
$←− {0, 1}. Thus, the success













Pr[b0 = 0 ∧ b1 = 0|delta = 0]




Pr[b0 = 1 ∧ b1 = 1|delta = 1] + Pr[θ = 0 ∧ b0 = 1 ∧ b1 = 0|δ = 1]






























































But |Pr[δ′ = δ]− 1/2| = Advpkem−pol−ind−cca2PKEM,B3 (k) = εPKEM (say) therefore we
have





From equations 4.14 and 4.15 we have
εPKEM − εDEM =
(α− β)
2
Therefore, ε = εPKEM + εDEM (4.16)
Thus we have
|Pr[E2]− 1/2| = Advpkem−pol−ind−cca2PKEM,B3 (k) + Adv
dem−ind−cca2
DEM,B2 (k)
Theorem 4.7. If PKEM is secure against chosen ciphertext attacks against policy-
indistinguishability then PKEM-DEM is secure against chosen ciphertext attacks on
policy indistinguishability as given in Definition 4.2 with restriction 2a.
In particular we have
Advpkem−dem−pol−ind−2a−cca2PKEM-DEM (k) ≤




Proof of Theorem 4.7. Intuitively, since the message encrypted under the both the
policies is the same any advantage an adversary has in distinguishing between the
two policies encapsulated by the PKEM-DEM scheme must be due to an advantage
the adversary has in distinguishing between two policies encapsulated by the PKEM
scheme. In other words, any advantage an adversary has in breaking policy indist-
inguishability of PKEM-DEM can be translated into advantage in breaking policy
indistinguishability of PKEM.
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Specifically, B is an adversary against policy indistinguishability of PKEM. It
runs A and accurately simulates the game, Gpbes−pol−ind−2a−cca2−cuPKEM−DEM,A , for A. B runs
A with the public-key pk. When adversary A adds/corrupts a user, ui, in phase 1,
B stores the user ui and associated attributes in a list. For decryption queries in
phase 1 B does the following: 1) B submits C1 to its PKEM oracle and gets either
a ⊥ or (pol,K2), 2) if ⊥, it returns ⊥ to A, 3) else if f(u, pol) = 1 returns K2 and
DEM.Decrypt(K2, C2) otherwise it returns ⊥. On receiving m and pol1 and pol2
from A, B does the following: 1) verifies that all of the of the corrupted users ui





1 encapsulates polb, 3) it computes C
∗
2 ← DEM.Encrypt(m,K∗2)
and returns challenge ciphertext (C∗1 , C
∗
2). For user corruption requests in phase 2, B
verifies that the corrupted user satisfies both pol0 and pol1. For decryption queries
from A in phase 2, B responds similarly to phase 1 except that when C1 = C∗1 ,
B returns K2 and DEM.Decrypt(K2, C2) if f(u, pol) = 1 and ⊥ otherwise where
u is submitted along with decryption query. When A outputs a guess bit δ, B
outputs its guess bit b′ = δ. Clearly, B accurately simulates the PKEM-DEM game
environment for A. Therefore we have
Pr[Gpkem−pol−ind−cca2PKEM,B (k) = b] = Pr[b
′ = b] = Pr[δ = b]
= Pr
[
Gpkem−dem−pol−ind−2a−cca2PKEM-DEM,B (k) = b
]
⇒ Advpkem−pol−ind−cca2PKEM,B (k) = Avd
pkem−dem−pol−ind−2a−cca2
PKEM-DEM,B (k)
Thus any advantage A has in breaking policy indistinguishability of PKEM-DEM
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is translated into advantage in breaking policy indistinguishability of PKEM.
4.6 Application Design Issues
We now discuss some design challenges that need to be addressed when de-
veloping applications with PBES and certain properties of PBES that potentially
limit PBES’ suitability for certain kinds of applications.
Trust Model for KDCs An important issue in deploying PBES for an applica-
tion in a distributed setting is identifying a trust model, i.e., identifying KDCs that
an object encryptor can trust to distribute the object decryption key to appropriate
recipients. A simple trust model is for all users to trust a single KDC to appropri-
ately distribute decryption keys for their objects. However, a more scalable model
would be to have multiple KDCs that users can trust for different sets of users and
objects. For example, every domain may have its own KDC that is responsible for
distributing message decryption keys to users within the domain appropriately as
was proposed for IBE [68]. The choice of trust model varies from application to
application and we believe that a domain-based approach will be suitable for many
applications. This trust model is similar to that of other policy-based encryption
schemes that trust key distribution servers in recipient domains to distribute keys
to appropriate users.
KDC Public-Key Distribution and Revocation Another challenge is dis-
tributing authentic public-keys of KDCs and timely revocation information for those
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keys. Recently, schemes to distribute keys via DNS have been proposed [68, 41] and
such an approach would be suitable for distribution of KDC public keys. While
these schemes do not provide strong security guarantees (e.g., they are vulnerable
to DNS cache poisoning attacks), wider deployment of the secure version of DNS,
namely, DNSSEC [3], will improve the security.
Policy Specification Language and Enforcement Engine Another issue is
the identification, deployment and use of an appropriate policy specification lan-
guage and enforcement engine. The language should be sufficiently expressive and
the engine should be user-friendly, have strong performance and ideally should have
formally verified assurances. Furthermore, standardization of tools can significantly
aid in achieving software and interface compatibility when exchanging objects across
domains. While there are a range of potential languages and tools we believe that
tools based on XACML are a good candidate for PBES. These tools have been used
to specify flexible policies in various types of access control systems3. In particular,
they allow us to specify flexible policies of the types described above including the
use of attribute based expressions with string and numerical attributes that may be
combined with AND, OR and NOT operands as well as context variables (e.g., time
of day). The XACML language has been standardized and there exist several im-
plementations of engines for policy verification among which Sun’s implementation
is quite popular and Margrave has been formally verified [31].
3http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/download.php/27298/xacmlRefs-V1-84-1.htm
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Key escrow Given the PKEM part of any encrypted object the KDC can always
decrypt it to reveal the DEM decryption keys for the object. Therefore, our system
provides key escrow service via the KDC for the symmetric object keys. Note
that in regular mode of operation the KDC never sees the encrypted objects, just
the encrypted object DEM keys. This kind of key escrow is common to several
encryption systems that minimize encryption key distribution tasks. For example,
in IBE [16] or CP-ABE [10] the PKG can always generate a private key for any given
public key, however, under normal mode of operation the PKG never sees encrypted
messages. The difference being that a PKG provides escrow for private keys while
we provide escrow for symmetric keys. This key escrow property may limit the
applicability of our scheme in certain applications that demand strong end-to-end
confidentiality assurances. For example, exchange of sensitive content between two
parties that know each other. In general, in large systems where senders wish to
send confidential messages to a set of (possibly unknown) recipients that satisfy a
given policy such strong assurances may not be needed.
Online nature Since recipients need to contact the KDC for every decryption,
the KDC needs to be always online and have adequate throughput to support this
mediated decryption. This property of being always online may limit the applicabil-
ity of our scheme for applications that have an offline nature. For example, exchange
of secure messages in a sensor network that have limited connectivity to CAs/KDCs.
However, we observe that many distributed applications being developed and de-
ployed today have a largely online nature in that users usually access objects over
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the network. We argue that in such an online world many of these applications can
accommodate the presence of an online KDC. Furthermore, in applications where
auditing and accountability is needed, mediated decryption offers an ideal oppor-
tunity for providing such capabilities. In Section 5.2.3 we study the throughput of
a prototype implementation of a KDC and demonstrate that adequate throughput
can be achieved with today’s general purpose compute systems.
Arguments that support the need for online key generation/ distribution servers
have also been implicitly made by other policy encryption systems such as IBE and
CP-ABE for PKGs to be available to generate and distribute private keys to users
on a regular basis as these system employ short-lived keys to support revocation
capabilities. Other systems such as PEAPOD [42] require recipients to contact an
online CA for every object as well. In all these systems a security concern that
arises from their online nature is the potential compromise of the KDC/CA/PKG
private keys. To minimize this possibility, threshold decryption and key generation
functions can be deployed over multiple servers to provide both increased intrusion
tolerance and availability [6, 35, 39].
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Chapter 5
Application Integration and Evaluation
In this chapter we demonstrate the use of CP-ASBE and PBES schemes pro-
posed in this work by integrating them with practical applications. We also under-
take a preliminary performance evaluation of the proposed schemes. Specifically, in
Section 5.1 we illustrate the use of CP-ASBE by employing it to provide message
confidentiality in a novel messaging system that we proposed, namely, Attribute-
Based Messaging (ABM). In Section 5.2 we illustrate the use of PBES by employing
it to enable conditional sharing of sensitive sensor data among the operators of the
Power Grid.
5.1 Attribute-Based Messaging
Attribute-Based Messaging (ABM) enables messages to be addressed using at-
tributes of recipients rather than an explicit list of recipients or mailing lists with
pre-defined members. Such attributes can be derived from any available source,
including enterprise databases, and dispatched as Internet electronic mail (email)
messages or other types of messaging. For example, a message about a restricted
fellowship opportunity could be emailed to all of the female graduate students in en-
gineering who have passed their qualifying exams. Such dynamic lists provide three
primary advantages over static mailing lists: efficiency, exclusiveness, and intension-
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ality. Efficiency means that messages are more likely to reach only the recipients
that care about them. For example, if a message for the faculty on sabbatical is sent
only to the ones with that attribute rather than the general faculty mailing list, then
six sevenths of the faculty will be spared an unwanted message. Exclusiveness means
that a sensitive message excludes parties that should not receive the message. For
example a message from the dean to the untenured faculty in a given department to
solicit feedback on the clarity of tenure standards provided by the department’s se-
nior faculty might have this feature. Intensionality means that an address describes
the recipients rather than listing them. For example, a message to the attending
and primary-care physicians for Sara Smith saves the sender the need to know the
names or addresses of the recipients. ABM has applications in enterprises using
the enterprise database for internal messages. It provides benefits for Customer
Relationship Management (CRM) and similar circumstances where a sender needs
targeted messaging to clients, members, and so on. It also has applications to alert
messaging, like health alert networks.
However, to achieve its full potential, an ABM design must resolve significant
security concerns. Access control and confidentiality are two such concerns. ABM
messaging becomes more beneficial as it exploits richer attribute information. How-
ever, user attribute information is sensitive and allowing anyone and everyone to
target messages based on any or all user attributes could increase spam and violate
the privacy of recipients. For example, who, if anyone, should be able to target a
message to all of the employees who earn more than $150,000? It is possible to ap-
point an ABM super user as the only party that can send ABM messages, but a more
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scalable solution would regulate the rights of potential senders based on a general
‘address authorization’ policy. On the other hand, it is not obvious how to do this,
since solutions like Access Control Lists (ACL) are likely to be unmanageable. As
for confidentiality, current email systems offer the ability to encrypt messages end-
to-end using public keys. For sensitive messages this provides valuable protection
against compromised email relays or eavesdropping relay administrators. However,
ABM cannot directly use this solution since message senders may not have an ex-
plicit list of the recipients of a message and, even if the recipients were known, it is
probably not scalable to collect all of the necessary certificates to provide encryption
for each recipient.
We addressed the first concern using Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC)
in [12] and focus on addressing message confidentiality in this chapter. Specifically,
we address the message confidentiality challenge by employing CP-ABE to encrypt
messages using attributes. Translating this to ABM system, a sender can encrypt his
message using attributes so that only users that satisfy the specified attributes can
decrypt the message. This approach has two advantages. First, a message sender can
encrypt his message directly (end-to-end) to the recipients without having to trust
intermediate servers with the message contents. Second, the attribute expression
used to target the message can also be used to specify the users that could decrypt
the message. We show how CP-ABE is naturally integrated into an intra-enterprise
ABM architecture and perform a preliminary evaluation of CP-ASBE against BSW
CP-ABE scheme in this architecture.
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5.1.1 CP-ASBE for ABM
ABM assumes a context where there is a set of attributes that can be accessed
and used for authorization and messaging. In particular, any enterprise has attribute
data about its employees in its databases. We will refer generally to the parties who
can send or receive ABM messages based on these attributes as users. A user can
have zero or more values for any attribute1. For example, a university might have




Department = Computer Science
Department = Mathematics
Course Teaching = CS219
Course Teaching = CS486
Course Teaching = MATH523
Date of Join = 06/24/1988
Annual Salary = 80, 000
In the above example the user is affiliated with two departments and is teaching
three courses. So he has multiple values for those attributes. In general, the attribute
value pairs used in the system can be classified as, 1) boolean: those with a yes or no
value, 2) enumerated: those with multiple non-numerical values and 3) numerical:
those with multiple numerical values. This attribute information may not all be
available in one centralized database but, instead, might be distributed over multiple
databases that are managed by different units of an enterprise. An ABM system
makes use of this information, abstracted as user attributes, to dynamically create
1We restrict users from having multiple numerical values for the same attribute during our
performance evaluations as BSW CP-ABE encryption system cannot handle multiple numerical
values for a given attribute.
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recipient lists. To have this attribute information available to the ABM system
ABM envisions the use of a data services layer that presents a view of the attribute
data after extracting it from the disparate databases. Some attributes are verified
or established by the enterprise, like immigration status, age and salary, whereas
others may be maintained by users, like a list of hobbies. In this work we focuses
on the former attributes.
The CP-ASBE (and BSW CP-ABE) scheme considers attributes simply as la-
bels, i.e., arbitrary strings, rather than as attribute, value pairs as described above.
Furthermore, the underlying mathematics can only check for equality of strings and
hence only equality of strings is supported by default in encryption policies. How-
ever, the three types of attribute value pairs used by ABM system are supported as
follows. Boolean attributes are represented using just the attribute name since only
positive Boolean attributes are ever used as only monotonic policies are supported.
Enumerated attributes are converted into multiple unique strings by concatenating
the attribute name, a delimiter and one of the attribute values. In order to sup-
port numerical attributes and allow numerical comparisons in policies, CP-ASBE
(and BSW CP-ABE) uses strings to represent individual bits of the numerical value.
That is, numerical values are represented using a bag of strings, one for each bit of
the value. For example, a 3-bit numerical attribute Level with value 4 is represented
using the following strings: Level:1**, Level:*0*, and Level:**0. Now a policy with
a numerical comparison can be represented using equalities on the strings repre-
senting bits. For example, the policy Level ≥ 2 can be translated as Level:1** OR
Level:*1*.
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An ABM system has three primary types of policies as described below.
1. The delivery policy is a sender-defined policy that specifies the set of users his
message is targeted for. This is the ‘ABM address’ associated with a message.
The message is routed only to users who have an attribute-set that satisfies
this policy.
2. The address authorization policy controls the ability of a user to target mes-
sages using an ABM address. This is a system-wide policy and specifies which
users have permission to target messages to a given attribute based on their
own attributes. Conceptually, this policy determines the set of users that have
permission to send messages to a given ABM address and the set of ABM ad-
dresses to whom a given user is allowed to send messages. This policy therefore
controls access to the system.
3. The encryption policy is another sender-defined policy that specifies which
users will have the ability to decrypt an encrypted message. The encryp-
tion policy associated with an encrypted message defines the combination of
attributes needed to decrypt the message. This would typically be the at-
tributes held by the recipients as specified by the delivery policy, but there
are cases where key management is improved by allowing the delivery policy
to be a subset of the encryption policy.
Table 5.1 describes the language used for ABM addresses and address autho-
rization policy.
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Table 5.1: Grammar for ABM Addresses and Rules
a ∈ Attribute
v ∈ Numerals | Strings
Delivery Policy R ::= c
Condition c ::= l | (c or c) | (c and c)
Literal l ::= (a rel v) | (v rel a rel v)
Relation rel ::= < | > | = | ≤ | ≥
Authorization Rule S ::= l← c
In ABM, the encryption policy is effectively same as the ABM address (delivery
policy) that routes the message to recipients. However, while the ABM system
and thus the delivery policy use attribute, value pairs, CP-ASBE (and BSW CP-
ABE) scheme considers attributes simply as labels, i.e., arbitrary strings. Thus
we implemented a policy translator that converts a given delivery policy into a
valid encryption policy by converting all attribute value pairs, except for numerical
attributes (numerical attributes are automatically converted by the CP-ASBE and
BSW CP-ABE implementations), in the delivery policy into unique attribute strings
as described above.
5.1.2 ABM Architecture
Figure 5.1 illustrates the architecture of our ABM system and its associated
security system, which strongly influences the overall structure. The ABM sys-
tem comprises a Policy Specialization Server (PSS) to authenticate and help users
compose policy compliant ABM addresses, a Policy Decision Point (PDP) with the
address authorization policy, an attribute database, an ABM server associated with











Figure 5.1: ABM Architecture
ient lists and mediates other components, and an Attribute Authority that issues
attribute keys to the users. These components provide an infrastructure for three
attribute-based policies for messaging, the system-wide address authorization policy,
the user-defined delivery policy and the encryption policy.
The Policy Specialization (PS) Path authenticates the user, evaluates his at-
tributes from the database with the policy decision point (PDP), and retrieves the
address authorization policy specialized to the user. This eight step communica-
tion is represented by solid lines in Figure 5.2. In the first step, PS1, the user logs
into the PSS. The PSS uses the enterprise authentication infrastructure to authen-
ticate the user. Next at PS2, the PSS sends the user’s information to the ABM
server and requests the specialized address authorization policy for the user. In
steps PS3 and PS4 the ABM server queries and retrieves the user’s attributes from
the attribute database. In step PS5 the ABM server sends the user’s attributes to












Policy Specialization (PS) Path:  
1. Authenticate User
2. User Info. (ID)
3. User Info. (ID)
4. User Attributes
5. User ID and Attributes
6. Routable Attributes 
7. Routable Attributes
8. ABM Address
Figure 5.2: Policy Specialization Path
address authorization rules in the policy against the user’s attributes to form the
specialized address authorization policy. In this case it is a list of attributes that
the user is allowed to use in his delivery policies or ABM addresses. In step PS6 it
returns the routable attributes (literals) from the specialized authorization policy
that the user can route on. The ABM server then returns the specialized authoriza-
tion policy to the policy specialization server in step PS7. In step PS8, the policy
specialization server provides an interface to the user to create a delivery policy by
combining the routable address literals in the specialized authorization policy with
ranges and boolean connectives as permitted. This is then saved by the user as the
ABM address (delivery policy).
In the Messaging (MS) Path, users send and receive ABM messages using any













Messaging (MS) Path: 
1. Send (ABM) message (SMTP)
2. Notify ABM Host 
3. Receive (ABM) messages (SMTP)
4. Send resolved messages 
Address Resolution (AR) Path:
1. User ID and Authorization
2. Policy Decision
3. ABM Address
4. Resolved list of Addresses
MS3
MS4
Figure 5.3: Messaging and Address Resolution Path
a valid encryption policy using the policy translator described in Section 5.1.1. A
user composes a message and encrypts the body of the message using the encryption
policy.
The delivery policy (or ABM address) is included in the message as an at-
tachment. The message with encrypted body and ABM address as the attachment
is signed using S/MIME [60, 61] for sender authentication. The user then sends
the message to a pre-specified email address such as abm@localdomain.com in step
MS1. The enterprise MTA is configured to notify the ABM server when it receives
a message for the pre-specified address as shown in step MS2. After processing the
message, as described in address resolution path below, the ABM server invokes the
enterprise MTA in step MS3 to deliver the message to a list of recipients as specified
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by the ABM address. Each receiver gets her message in her inbox in step MS4.
In the Address Resolution (AR) Path, the ABM server processes messages to
authenticate the sender, determine whether the sender is authorized to target the
message based on the associated delivery policy, and determine the recipients defined
by the delivery policy (dotted lines in Figure 5.3). Upon receiving the message, the
ABM server: 1) verifies the S/MIME signature on the message to authenticate
the user, and 2) queries the attribute database for the sender’s attributes. In step
AR1, the ABM server checks with the PDP that the sender is authorized to send
the message to the ABM address included in the message. In step AR2, the PDP
evaluates the delivery policy for accessing the attributes contained in the ABM
address against the sender’s attributes and responds in the affirmative only if the
user is allowed access to all attribute literals in the ABM address. The ABM server
then resolves the ABM address to a list of email addresses by querying the attribute
database in steps AR3 and AR4.
The Attribute Keying (AK) Path describes steps of the AA, which is similar
to a certificate authority and supports keying needs of users such as attributes and
S/MIME certificates. After receiving an encrypted message, if the user does not
have a current set of keys to decrypt the message, she requests them from the AA
(dashed-dotted lines in Figure 5.4). A user authenticates to the AA in step AK1.
The AA sends the user information (e.g. user id) to the enterprise database in step
AK2. The database responds with the most current information about the user’s
attributes in step AK3. With the attribute set the AA gets from the database, it
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Figure 5.4: Attribute Keying Path
attribute, value pairs into attribute strings as described in Section 5.1.1. AA sends
the generated CP-ABE key back to the user over a secure channel in step AK4. The
user can now decrypt her message using this key in step AK5.
5.1.3 Experimental Evaluation of CP-ASBE in ABM
To evaluate the architectural framework presented in Section 5.1.2, we imple-
mented a prototype ABM system in [12, 11]. In this section we describe how this
prototype is used to evaluate CP-ASBE. We first describe the experimental setup
and then present the results from the experimental evaluation of CP-ASBE and
compare them with those obtained when using BSW CP-ABE.
A two-level CP-ASBE scheme provides better functionality over CP-ABE
schemes in terms of, 1) better supporting compound attributes and 2) support-
ing multiple numerical value assignments for a given attribute in a single key. In
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order to gauge the cost of this additional functionality we compared the encryption,
decryption and key generation times using ABM addresses that were used to eval-
uate the ABM prototype after converting them into encryption policies. We now
describe how the ABM addresses and user keys were generated.
Attribute Distribution and Database Population We populated a SQL database
with 60,000 users and assigned attributes to them in the following manner. The sys-
tem had a total of 100 attributes and about half of them are numerical attributes.
The distribution of attributes in the user population affects the number of recipi-
ents a given ABM address resolves to. The number and type of attributes a user
has also affects the attribute-key generation time. Users were assigned an attribute
based on the incidence probability of that attribute. For example, if an attribute
has an incidence probability of 0.1 then 10% of the user population is assigned that
attribute. For our test database, most of the attributes (80%), had a probability
of incidence that ranged from 0.0001 to 0.01, 10% had a probability of incidence
that was between 0.5 and 0.9 and the remaining 10% had the probability close to
1. This distribution allowed a big range in the number of recipients per message,
and, intuitively, this distribution also reflects organizations where all the users have
some common attributes and rest of the attributes are sparsely distributed in the
population.
Encryption Policy Generation ABM addresses served as encryption policies
after appropriate translation by our tool. The complexity of an ABM address affects
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the performance on the address resolution path by affecting both the number of
recipients it resolves to and the database query resolution time. It also affects the
encryption and decryption latencies as ABM addresses. We wrote a probabilistic
ABM address generator using Java, which created uniformly random ABM addresses
of varying complexity in a disjunctive normal form. Each ABM address consists of
a number of terms combined with the OR operand. Each term consists of a number
of literals (as defined in the grammar of Table 5.1) combined with the and operand.
Specifically, we varied the number of terms for a given ABM address between one and
five (chosen uniformly randomly) and the number of literals in each term between one
and three (also chosen uniformly randomly). Each literal was randomly assigned an
attribute from the routable list of attributes of the message sender. These addresses
were then translated into encryption policies. The resulting policies had the number
of leaf nodes ranging from 23 to 66 (including the “bag of bits” representation of
numerical attributes).
User Key Generation For each encryption policy, a representative set of keys
that satisfy the policy are generated and used for decryption. Specifically, 1) a
key is generated for each conjunctive clause in the policy such that it satisfies the
clause and 2) a key is generated for each combination of conjunctive clauses in the
policy such that the key satisfies all the clauses in the combination. The generated
keys had boolean attributes, ranging from 1 to 422, i.e., including the “bag of bits”
representation for numbers with 64 bits used to represent each integer.
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(a) Encryption Time (b) Decryption Time
(c) Key Generation Time
Figure 5.5: Encryption and Decryption Times
Results For encryption, decryption and key generation when using BSW CP-ABE
we used the CP-ABE toolkit (available at http://acsc.csl.sri.com/cpabe/). For
encryption, decryption and key generation when using CP-ASBE we used the CP-
ASBE toolkit that we developed by extending the CP-ABE toolkit as described in
Section 3.6. Both implementations used a 160-bit elliptic curve group constructed
on the curve y2 = x3 + x over a 512-bit field. Decryption time for a policy is the
average of decryption times with all the keys generated for that policy as described
above. Experiments were run on a Linux box with quad core 3.0Ghz Intel Xeon
and 2GB of RAM.
107
Key generation, encryption and decryption times are shown in Figure 5.5. As
expected, key generation time was found to be linear in the number of attributes
in the key, and CP-ASBE imposed very little overhead over BSW CP-ABE. On
an average, CP-ASBE imposed 18ms overhead per numerical attribute, i.e., per
set, in the key and no overhead when there are no numerical attributes. To put
this overhead in perspective, generating a key with 2 numerical attributes (and 145
boolean attributes in total) took 5s seconds when using BSW CP-ABE scheme and
5.035s when using CP-ASBE scheme. Encryption time is also, as expected, linear in
the number of leaves in the policy tree, and CP-ASBE imposed very little overhead
when compared to BSW CP-ABE. On an average, CP-ASBE imposed 8.3ms over-
head per translating node in the policy. Since decryption time is dependent on both
the structure of the policy tree and the key used for decryption, it varied significantly
even for a given policy size. However, in this case too CP-ASBE scheme imposed
very little to no overhead over BSW CP-ABE, 6.7ms on average. Overhead results
are consistent with our efficiency analysis and performance numbers in general are
consistent with those reported in [10].
5.2 Context-Sensitive Data Sharing in the Power Grid
The North American electric power grid is a highly interconnected system
hailed as one of the greatest engineering feats of the 20th century. However, increas-
ing demand for electricity and an aging infrastructure are putting increasing pressure
on the reliability and safety of the grid as witnessed in recent blackouts [73, 29]. Fur-
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thermore, deregulation of the power industry has moved it away from vertically in-
tegrated centralized operations to coordinated decentralized operations. Reliability
Coordinators (RCs) are tasked by Federal Energy Regulation Commission (FERC)
and North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) with overseeing reliable
operation of the grid and providing reliability coordination and oversight over a
wide area. Balancing Authorities (BAs) are tasked with balancing load, generation
and scheduled interchange in real-time in a given Balancing Authority Area (BAA).
BAA is a geographic area where a single entity balances generation and loads in
real-time to maintain reliable operation. BAA are the primary operational entities
that are subject to NERC regulatory standards for reliability. Every generator,
transmission facility, and end-use customer is in a BAA.
Currently, sensor readings from substations in utilities2 are sent via a com-
munication network to the Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA)
systems in the local BA that controls the system and to the RC that oversees re-
liable operation of the system. There are operations taking place at various time
granularities to keep the power system stable and reliable. Among the frequent op-
erations protection and control mechanisms at substation operate at the granularity
of milliseconds, state estimators and contingency analysis in BAs and RCs operate
at the granularity of minutes and hourly and day ahead power markets run by RCs
operate at the granularity of hour and day respectively.
In order to improve the reliability of the power grid while meeting the in-
2In this paper the term ’utility’ is used to refer to power grid entities in a broad sense including
generator owners/operators, transmission owners/operators, distributors and load serving entities
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creased power demand, the industry is moving towards wide-area measurement,
monitoring and control. The Department of Energy (DOE), NERC and electric
utility companies formed the North American SynchroPhasor Initiative (NASPI)
(www.naspi.org) with a vision to improve the reliability of the power grid through
wide area measurement, monitoring and control. It’s mission is to create a robust,
widely available and secure synchronized data measurement infrastructure with as-
sociated monitoring and analysis tools for better planning and reliable operation of
the power grid. NASPI envisions deployment of hundreds of thousands of Phasor
Measurement Units (PMUs) across the grid that pump data at 30 samples/second to
hundreds of applications in approximately 140 BAAs across the country. PMUs are
clock synchronized (through GPS) sensors that can read current and voltage phasors
at a substation bus on the transmission power network. Phasor Data Concentrators
(PDCs) at substations or control centers time align the data from multiple PMUs
before sending them to applications. PMUs give direct access to the state of the
grid at any given instant in contrast to having to estimate the state as is done
today. Figure 5.6 shows a high-level architecture envisioned for PMUs. Applica-
tions envisioned to utilize this data have varying requirements. Open loop control
applications like state estimation have critical time alignment requirements while
post event analysis applications like disturbance analysis have critical accuracy and
message rate requirements. Feedback control applications like transient stability
control have critical latency, availability, accuracy, message rate and time alignment
requirements [28].

















Figure 5.6: Proposed NASPI PMU Architecture
local BA and RC they are not required or expected to share data with other utilities.
This is because, while the utilities have to cooperate with each other to operate the
grid safely and reliably they are also business competitors. Furthermore, this data
can reveal a fine grained view of a utilities network and the current state of that
network. In the wrong hands the former can make the utility a target of attacks
and the latter can affect the wholesale electricity markets and as a consequence
the utility itself adversely. Another consideration hampering data sharing is the
concern of utilities that they might open themselves up for continuous compliance
monitoring. However there is mutual benefit in sharing PMU data widely as it will
help in operating the grid safely and reliably and in avoiding overloading, outages,
brown-outs and blackouts [73, 29]. Sharing PMU data will also help in planning,
post disturbance/event analysis [29] and for research and development purposes.
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Currently two pilot deployments each with about 75 PMUs exist in Eastern [30]
and Western [21] Interconnects. There is need for a framework that provides for
secure and flexible data sharing before a wide area full scale deployment of PMUs
can be realized [28]. While we discussed North American power grid above, similar
data sharing problem exists in other power grids such as that of Australia, Europe
and Japan that are either in the process of deregulation or are already deregulated.
The use of PMUs for wide area monitoring and control is also being considered in
those grids.
5.2.1 Requirements
Given the sensitive nature of the data and the reluctance of utilities to share
data, realizing wide area data sharing poses many challenges. First, establishing
pair-wise trust between all the entities in a wide area is a O(n2) problem and does not
scale. Second, while the system is inherently transitive, i.e., highly interconnected
where a local disturbance can have impact over a wide area, trust relationships are
not always transitive. Third, data is usually shared on a need to know basis and it
is not known in advance who might be needing the data, e.g., for applications like
post event analysis.
In studying the data sharing needs in the power grid we argue that a natural
approach is to enable conditional access to data whereby utilities make data avail-
able to each other based on their ability to satisfy policies. Any solution requires a
viable architecture, a data protection mechanism and a flexible policy enforcement
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mechanism. Specifically a desirable solution should satisfy the following require-
ments:
Data sharing with multiple recipients Support data sharing with multiple
recipients all of whom may not be known in advance. In the power grid for example,
when data is to be shared based on prevailing or past conditions in the grid, e.g.,
post event analysis applications like disturbance analysis, it is not possible for the
data owner to know ahead of time with whom or how many entities the data might
need to be shared. For example, consider that the tripping of a line in Ohio caused
a disturbance that eventually lead to the August 2003 blackout - the largest in the
North American Power Grid’s history [73, 29].
Flexible policy specification and enforcement Data owners should be able
to specify and associate flexible policies with data in a secure manner such that only
entities that satisfy the policies can access the data. These policies may be context-
based in that data may only be shared based on the current state of environment.
Furthermore, the context-based policies may be such that the data owner may or
may not be able to verify the satisfaction of such policies on his own. For example,
voltage disturbances in the power grid are only visible in the vicinity of the event,
which may be outside the data owner’s range of observability, but their effect might
propagate over a wide area eventually.
Data exchange on open and untrusted networks Given that the data sharing
is needed between many entities dispersed over a wide geographic area requiring a
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trusted or even a closed network for data sharing is impractical and very expensive.
Protect data and policy secrecy Given the sensitive nature of the data and the
need for sharing over open and untrusted networks data secrecy must be protected.
Furthermore, in open and untrusted networks the secrecy of policies associated with
the data should also be protected from general public as they might reveal sensitive
information about the data and since the data owning organizations would consider
their policies themselves to be confidential. In some cases the policies need to be
kept secret even from an authorized recipient as the policies might reveal who else
might have access to the data thereby revealing business relationships of the data
owner which is undesirable.
Security Any solution should provide adequate security for both the data and
associated policies. Specifically it should secure them against active and colluding
adversaries.
Efficiency and Compatibility Any solution should be efficient in key manage-
ment including revocation and should have low communication and computation
overheads. Furthermore, the solution should be compatible with other infrastruc-
ture components.
5.2.2 PBES for Context-Sensitive Data Sharing in the Power Grid
In this section we illustrate how PBES is used to enable policy based data
sharing in the power grid using an example usage scenario. First, we note that
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Table 5.2: Example of Policy Elements
Policy Element Example
Identity Email address, Distinguished Name
Group or Role Transmission System Operator, Relia-
bility Engineer
Attribute Certified Dispatcher
Context Location of voltage disturbance, Status
of a relay, Time of the day
policies in our system are arbitrary strings that can be parsed and enforced by
the KDC. Therefore, they are very flexible in nature. Policy elements of interest
for object encryption and in particular for data sharing in power grid include: 1)
identities where recipients must demonstrate ownership of identifiers, 2) groups or
roles where recipients must demonstrate membership to a group or role, 3) attributes
where recipients must demonstrate ownership of attributes that satisfy an attribute
expression, and 4) context where the KDC must verify environmental properties.
Policies may combine any of these elements and some example elements in the power
grid are shown in Table 5.2.
As an example, consider a Utility A under the jurisdiction of an RC B. While
Utility A is not willing to share its data with all other utilities in the area under
normal circumstances, it might find that it is in its interest to share that data with
some of them when they are experiencing a combination of events that might poten-
tially lead to a voltage collapse especially if no coordinated mitigation actions are
taken. Possible combination of events for voltage collapse are identified by system
planning static load flow analysis undertaken by NERC or the RC B. Specifically,
the policy of utility A for sharing data with any Utility X is as follows:
Grant Access if
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(Reliability Engineer in Utility X) AND (Utility X in RC B) AND
(Overloaded Tie Line between Utility X and Utility A) AND ((Below
Critical Reactive Power Reserves in Utility X) OR (Reactive Limiters active in Utility
X))
Utility A associates this policy with the data and encrypts it using the PKEM-
DEM scheme entrusting access control enforcement to (local) RC B, i.e., RC acts
as the KDC. It then posts this data on its public data repository (which may use
coarse-grained access control, for example, to limit write operations). If and when
the Transmission System Operator in utility C in the neighboring BAA notices an
overload on the tie line connecting utility C with A and the Generation System
Operator notices low reactive power reserves or reactive limiters turning on they
initiate mitigation procedures along with the Reliability Engineer. Reliability En-
gineer obtains the relevant encrypted data from utility A’s repository based on the
meta data associated with encrypted objects. Example of useful meta data are the
start time and end time of data samples contained in the encrypted object and
coarse grained PMU location information. Reliability Engineer then submits the
encrypted data key to the RC for decryption. RC upon verifying that the asso-
ciated policy is satisfied returns the data decryption key. Note that RC having a
wider view of the grid than Utility A is able to verify the occurrence of specified
conditions in Utility C. Reliability Engineer may repeat this action with all utilities
with which their organization shares a tie line that is overloaded. He may or may not
be successful in obtaining data based on the current policies of individual utilities.
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Reliability Engineer then feeds the data obtained into his contingency planning tool
and coordinates the mitigation plan with data sharing utilities based on the results.
Utility A might also have additional time constraints in its policy limiting the
data shared to a time window starting 30 minutes before the event (i.e., tie line
overload) and ending 30 minutes after the conditions are mitigated. We omitted
this detail in the policy example above for brevity. Furthermore, Utility A might be
sharing the data from its sensors with different entities under different conditions.
So in practice the policy associated with the data will be a complex policy consisting
of many sub polices similar to the one in the example above. So it is necessary to
preserve policy secrecy from legitimate recipients (apart from general public) to
prevent a recipient satisfying one sub policy to obtain the data from knowing other
sub policies. While PBES provides policy secrecy from general public and from
legitimate recipients it is possible to gain some information about the policy by
gaming the system and from side channels such as traffic patterns. Some of this
information leakage to outsiders can be mitigated by using secure TLS channels to
upload and download data from the data repositories but a full analysis of policy
information leakage is out of the scope of this paper.
Choosing RCs to act as KDCs to enforce access control on data owned by
utilities under their jurisdiction has the following two advantages. First, the trust
relationships of the RC with all the utilities under its jurisdiction are leveraged to
enable data sharing between utilities without the need to establish pairwise trust.
Currently RCs already administer Certificate Authorities (CAs) that issue certifi-
cates to users in the utilities based on the federated user identity databases at the
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utilities that it has access to. Second, an RC is ideally suited to enforce certain
context based policies that condition upon prevailing conditions in the grid, as in
the example above, as it has a much wider view of the grid than any single utility.
The environment/context attributes extracted from the current state of the power
grid by the RC along with the federated identity and attribute databases that the
RC has access to constitute the Attribute Database shown in Figure 4.1. In terms
of key management, in our system data owners only need to obtain the public keys
of KDCs in order to encrypt objects intended for any recipient that trusts those
KDCs. In the power grid knowing the public keys of the dozen or so RCs suffices
to reach all users registered in those RC domains. For data recipients we do not
add any additional key management burden but we require recipients to contact the
KDC for every decryption, which also provides support for immediate revocation
because the KDC verifies policies for every object it decrypts. In systems where
objects can potentially reside in repositories for a long time, immediate revocation
provides effective policy compliance at the time of access.
While the RC is able to enforce the access policy it is unlikely to have the
resources to manage the data itself. This is because RCs may oversee many BAAs,
e.g., Midwest Independent System Operator (MISO) manages 37 BAAs, and they
might have to manage large amounts of data (tens of thousands of objects adding
up to hundreds of petabytes) and enforce different access policies on data from
different control areas and utilities. A more feasible solution is the utilization of
data warehousing solutions whereby encrypted data with an associated (encrypted)
access policy is posted on a semi-trusted storage facility. The facility may be trusted
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to enforce coarse-grained access control such as limiting write operations to trusted
utilities and ensure availability but should not be trusted for access to content;
otherwise, it will become an attack target for access to all data [54]. So either utilities
themselves might host repositories for data they are willing to share or utilize an
external data warehousing facility to provide semi-trusted storage. Table 5.3 shows
which power grid entities play the roles of the components in the PBES architecture
presented in Figure 4.1.
Table 5.3: PBES Entities vs. Power Grid Entities
PBES Entities Power Grid Entities
Data Owner/Sender Utilities




Attribute Database Environmental Attributes based
on Power Grid State observed at
the RC along with Federated Iden-
tity/Attribute Databases at utilities
5.2.3 Prototype Implementation and Performance
We have implemented the PBES system and the PKEM-DEM construction
and measured its performance. The implementation is aimed at releasing an easy-to-
use toolkit in the near future that allows for integration in distributed applications.
The implementation is built using the Java Bouncycastle Library and its S/MIME
and CMS Processors. These libraries and processors were chosen to allow for plat-
form independence, flexible licensing of the toolkit and a simplified process for its
standardization. Bouncycastle has an open source license, CMS is a well accepted
standard for message encapsulation and S/MIME is a well accepted standard for
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public key encryption for multi-part messages (typically used in e-mail systems).
The PBES implementation provides interfaces for the following components:
1) object encryption, 2) policy decryption and verification and 3) object decryp-
tion. KDC private/public keys are assumed to be pre-created (e.g., using RSA key
generation tools) and installed. Using the provided KDC public key, the object en-
cryption component expects as input two files − one providing the message and one
providing the policy. It then encrypts these files using the PKEM-DEM encryption
scheme. While the object encryption interface treats both files as arbitrary strings,
we use XACML as the policy language in our system. To allow for the encryption
and transmission of the XACML policy within the S/MIME processors, we use the
OtherRecipientInfo type and value fields in S/MIME to specify the policy. The
policy decryption and verification interface expects as input an S/MIME encrypted
object with the PKEM format, the KDC private key, and an authenticated user
identity. For authentication we require users to initiate a TLS channel and provide
a username/password, which are checked against a salted password database. This
component then contacts the Attribute Database, which in our case is a SQL server,
using a SQL query with the authenticated identity. After receiving the attributes
it uses the XACML engine (in our case Sun’s Java implementation3) to verify the
decrypted policy. If the policy is satisfied it releases the DEM keys over the secure
channel. Finally, the object decryption component expects as input an encrypted
file and a DEM key using which it applies the DEM decryption and outputs a file
with the decrypted message.
3http://sunxacml.sourceforge.net/
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Performance We instantiate our PKEM-DEM scheme using an RSA-based CCA
secure KEM, RSA-KEM [67], and an OTCCA secure DEM, DEM1 [67, 27] (es-
sentially symmetric encryption with a message authentication code) as shown in
Figure 4.2. We use a sample XACML policy with rules that involve the combina-
tion of 10 different attributes each. We use boolean, string and numerical attributes
as well as a range of operands including AND, OR and NOT. Note that we do not
limit the number of attributes used in the system but just those used in each policy
rule for this evaluation. Such policies intuitively match the complexity of policies
that users can typically conceive of to protect data. Since PKEM-DEM is essen-
tially a very efficient encryption/decryption scheme the only potential performance
bottleneck for an application is the policy decryption and verification component.
To evaluate the performance we measure the throughput of this component, which
involves the following tasks: perform a RSA and an AES decryption, verify the
MAC, setup and message exchange over secure TLS channel, fetch attributes from
the Attribute Database and verify the policy. We use a 1024 bit RSA, 128 bit and
256 bit SHA-1, 128 bit AES, a SQL Attribute Database server located in the same
subnet over a gigabit link and the Sun XACML engine placed on the same server
as the KDC. The KDC server is a workstation with a 32-bit, 2.4 Ghz Pentium 4
processor while the database is a Windows 2003 Server with dual Intel Xeon 3.2GHz
processors. Averaged over 10, 000 runs the latency for the various tasks is as follows:
20.2ms for the RSA and AES decryption, negligible for the MAC, 44.7ms for the
TLS channel, 40ms to fetch attributes and 12.8ms to verify the policy for a total of
117.7ms. That is, we can support 510 requests/min.
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Performance Comparison PEAPOD requires mediated access similar to PBES
and while they do not implement their system, their calculations indicate a similar
performance of hundreds of requests per minute for the mediation server. Both
PBES and PEAPOD require mediated access while CP-ABE does not, therefore,
it is hard to compare the performance of these systems. However, we would like
to note that in practice CP-ABE also needs to be online for the simple reason
that in any system with a large number of users the attribute private keys for
individual users will expire with a distribution that pretty much requires the PKD
to be online at all times to generate and distribute new private keys to the users.
Furthermore, performance requirements for key generation are not trivial. Using
the cp-abe toolkit [10] the average cost for generating 10 attribute private keys is
2.64 seconds where 3 attributes are numerical and 7 are boolean. In a system where
a single PKG supports 50, 000 users (essentially a medium size organization) with
each user having 10 attributes all with a lifetime of one week (note that in the
absence of revocation all CP-ABE private keys need to be short lived) it will take a
PKG 36 hours to complete one round of key generation.
Application Analysis For the power grid data sharing application we envision
one or more KDCs (for fault tolerance and/or load balancing) being maintained at
each of the dozen or so RCs. These KDCs will serve hundreds of utilities across the
grid with each RC focusing more on the tens of utilities in their jurisdiction. Based
on an informal analysis of the data sharing needs in the grid we argue that each KDC
being able to support 510 requests/min is sufficient to satisfy the requirements. Also,
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the policy examples discussed above match the kind of policy complexity studied
in the performance analysis above. However, a formal analysis of data sharing
transaction patterns as well as a more comprehensive performance analysis taking




In this dissertation, we addressed the problem of secure, policy-based multi-
recipient data sharing and presented two novel policy-based data sharing schemes.
The first scheme we presented, namely, Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Set Based En-
cryption (CP-ASBE) enables policy-based data sharing with multiple recipients
without the need for trusted mediating servers to enforce the policy and thus min-
imizes trust liability. We showed that CP-ASBE is the first Ciphertext Policy-
Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) scheme to provide the ability to organize
attributes in user keys, after demonstrating the need for such ability in CP-ABE
schemes in order for them to be practical and efficient. We also showed that its abil-
ity to organize attributes in user keys enables CP-ASBE to support, (1) naturally
occurring compound attributes, (2) multiple numerical assignments for a given at-
tribute in a single key and (3) efficient key management, all of which are properties
needed in practical scenarios but are not provided by existing CP-ABE schemes. We
showed that it achieves this versatility with very little overhead through efficiency
analysis and performance evaluation of a prototype implementation integrated into
a novel application we proposed, called, Attribute-Based Messaging (ABM).
The second scheme we presented, namely, Policy Based Encryption System
(PBES), supports context-based policies and provides policy privacy. We showed
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that while PBES incurs some trust liability by leveraging a trusted mediator, it
achieves good properties of both mediated and unmediated solutions. We showed
that PBES is a suitable candidate to enable context-based conditional sharing of sen-
sitive sensor data among the operators of the Power Grid which improves efficiency
and reliability of the Power Grid. We prototyped the system and demonstrated its
performance to be reasonable.
While our proposed schemes achieve unique set of properties they do not
achieve all the desirable properties of a scheme addressing secure policy-based, multi-
recipient data sharing. Several open problems remain to be solved in this area.
Supporting context-based policies without relying on trusted mediating servers is
an important one. A related open problem is the lack of revocation in CP-ABE
schemes and ABE schemes in general which is a significant hindrance to their adop-
tion and deployment. While our CP-ASBE scheme and the key update scheme of
[14] alleviate this problem to a certain extent more work remains to be done in this
area. While we support flexible policies, and flexible attribute keys in our CP-ASBE
scheme we do not provide policy privacy nor do we support multiple attribute au-
thorities. The ABE scheme of [63] was extended to multiple authorities in [23, 50].
However, like [63] they can only support a single threshold gate for policies. The
CP-ABE scheme of [10] was extended to multiple authorities in [53] but was limited
to supporting disjunctive normal forms (DNF). Extending our work or proposing
new schemes that can achieve policy privacy and support multiple authorities while
retaining policy and attribute flexibility is an interesting open problem. CP-ASBE
is shown to be secure in Generic Group Model. Designing schemes secure in stan-
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dard model that achieve the flexibility of CP-ASBE is another direction of future
work.
We envision two directions of future work related to PBES. First, the ef-
ficiency of PBES can be improved by using other encryption schemes such as the
Tag-KEM/DEM framework [1]. Second, the practicality of PBES can be further ex-
plored by deeper integration with the power grid and by studying other real-world
applications such as distributed file sharing.
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